

Security Beyond the State: Global Security Assemblages in International Politics¹

RITA ABRAHAMSEN AND MICHAEL C. WILLIAMS

University of Ottawa

To date, most discussion of security privatization in international politics has been focused on the role of private military companies and mercenaries. This article seeks to shift the focus away from the battlefields and toward the less spectacular privatization and globalization of commercial private security. Drawing on Saskia Sassen's notion of state "disassembly," we situate the growth of private security within broader shifts in global governance. Pointing to the weakness of seeing the rise of private security as an erosion of state power and authority, we show instead a re-articulation of the public/private and global/local distinctions and relationships into what we term "global security assemblages." Analyzing the role of private security in two such assemblages in Sierra Leone and Nigeria, we show how a range of different security agents and normativities interact, cooperate and compete, to produce new institutions, practices and forms of security governance. Global security assemblages thus mark important developments in the relationship between security and the sovereign state, structures of political power and authority, and the operations of global capital.

Spurred by the apparent return of mercenary activities in Africa at the end of the Cold War, and given further impetus and urgency by the substantial involvement of private military contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq, the privatization of security has become one of the most controversial issues in contemporary international politics. Once obscure companies such as Blackwater, Triple Canopy, and Erinys have joined with tales of "neo-mercenaries" like Executive Outcomes in Sierra Leone and Simon Mann's attempted coup in Equatorial Guinea in 2004, to become the focus of widespread journalistic coverage, increasingly sophisticated scholarly analysis, as well as popular books, entertainment and Hollywood films.

Yet the privatization of security and its consequences go well beyond the activities of the private soldier. Away from the battlefields, in the day-to-day activities of ordinary life, private security has also become ubiquitous. Less spectacular than the "return of the dogs of war," commercial private security activities, ranging from manned guarding and alarm installation, to risk analysis and surveillance, have expanded at a phenomenal rate. Worldwide, the commercial private security market is now valued at \$165 billion, and its growth is forecast to continue at an annual rate of 8% for the foreseeable future (Securitas 2007). Indeed, what was once described as a "quiet revolution" in security provision has become global in scope (Shearing and Stenning 1981).

¹We are grateful to the UK ESRC (grant no. RES-223-25-0074) for supporting the research on which this article is based.

A whirlwind tour of the globe demonstrates the point: In the United Kingdom, private security personnel now outnumber the public police by a ratio of nearly two to one, and between 1951 and 2001 total employment in the sector increased from 66,950 to 161,013 (Jones and Newburn 2006; Mancini 2006). In the United States, the largest private security market in the world employs between 1.5 and 2 million people, outnumbering the public police by almost three to one. In Japan the sector has grown from 41,146 guards in 1972 to 459,305 in 2003, generating revenues of \$30.6 billion (Mancini 2006; Manning 2006:103; Yoshida and Leishman 2006).

In Russia the formal private security sector exploded following its legalization in 1992: within a year, there were 4,000 private security companies (PSCs) and by 1999 there were 6,775, as well as 4,612 in-house security operations. The number of personnel licensed to carry firearms has risen to 196,266, and the sector as a whole exceeds 850,000 employees (Volkov 2002). In Bulgaria as many as 9% of all employed males are estimated to be engaged in private security activities, with the industry's 130,000 personnel standing in sharp contrast to the country's 28,000 police officers (Gounev 2006). The expanding economies of Asia echo the trend: according to the *Hindustan Times*, the five million private security personnel in India outnumber the army, navy, air force, police, and the Central Bureau of Investigation put together, while in Asia's other economic giant, China, the number of guards are expected to grow from three to five million in the next 5 years (Petrie 2008).

In most Latin American countries too, private security officers outnumber public police, especially in the continent's mega-cities. In Brazil, for example, a 2001 study concluded that the state of Sao Paulo alone had 1,300 legal companies, employing 330,000 guards with 255,000 firearms—plus a further 5,000 unregistered, illegal PSCs, employing approximately 600,000 guards (Wood and Cardia 2006). On the African continent, South Africa is home to the largest private security market in the world measured as a percentage of GDP, while in most other countries the guards of private companies have become a familiar feature of the urban landscape, often representing one of the few sectors of employment growth (see Abrahamsen and Williams 2006).

This process of privatization, as the criminologist Ian Loader argues, marks a significant transformation in security provision in modern societies. In his words:

We are living in the midst of a potentially far-reaching transformation in the means by which order and security are maintained in liberal democratic societies, one that is giving rise to the fragmentation and diversification of policing provision, and ushering in a plethora of agencies and agents, each with particular kinds of responsibility for the delivery of policing and security services and technologies. What we might call a shift from police to policing has seen the sovereign state—hitherto considered focal to both provision and accountability in this field—reconfigured as but one node of a broader, more diverse “network of power.” (Loader 2000:323)

Loader's astute observations are essential when thinking about the shifting nature of contemporary security. But as our brief survey shows, privatization goes well beyond liberal democratic societies. It is a global phenomenon, and the “networks of power” that it involves are now often transnational, as the expansion of private security has seen the rise of a world-wide marketplace and transnational PSCs of truly global scale. The world's largest PSC, Group4Securicor, currently operates in 115 countries, employs over 530,000 people, and ranks as one of the London Stock Exchange's 100 largest corporations by capitalization. In 2007, it reported a turnover of \$9 billion. Securitas, the second largest company defined by geographical reach, operates in over 30 countries and employs

over 254,000 people. Listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange, Securitas in 2007 recorded annual sales of \$10.6 billion. Spanish Prosegur is another global player, with operations across Europe and Latin America, while companies like ADT and Chubb have a vast presence across the globe.²

In this article we argue that the growth and globalization of commercial private security, while less eye-catching than the privatized military, mark important transformations in contemporary global security governance. By situating security privatization within broader transformations in the relationship between public and private power and authority, we demonstrate the emergence of what we call *global security assemblages*; settings where a range of different global and local, public and private security agents and normativities interact, cooperate and compete to produce new institutions, practices, and forms of security governance. As such, what is at stake in “security privatization” is much more than a simple transfer of previously public functions to private actors. Instead, these developments indicate important developments in the relationship between security and the sovereign state, structures of political power and authority, and the operations of global capital. In this sense, security governance is increasingly beyond the state, and is entwined with a broader rearticulation of public–private and global–local relations.

The Emergence of Global Security Assemblages

In a recent analysis, Saskia Sassen argues that contemporary globalization is best understood as a rearticulation of global and national structures. At the center of these processes is the partial “disassembling” of national states and the corresponding development of new “global assemblages.” Seen in this light, privatization and globalization are not simply forces eroding the state, as states have themselves actively participated in their own partial “disassembly.” As Sassen puts it, “We generally use terms such as deregulation, financial and trade liberalization, and privatization to describe the changed authority of the state when it comes to the economy. The problem with such terms is that they only capture the withdrawal of the state from regulating its economy. They neither register all the ways in which the state participates in setting up the new frameworks through which globalization is furthered, nor do they capture the associated transformations inside the state...” (2006:234).

The notion of a dual process of state disassembly and (global) reassembly provides a powerful heuristic for analyzing security privatization, and for capturing its implications for contemporary security governance. By situating the emergence of global security assemblages within these interrelated transformations in governance, we show how security privatization is part of a broader restructuring and reconfiguration of public–private and global–local relations. Below, we focus on three interrelated aspects of this process: neoliberal economics and conceptions of “networked governance” in public policy and security provision; shifting norms or “mentalities” of security; and the commodification of security and the increasing salience of risk-based security thinking and technology.

Perhaps most obviously and importantly, the growth and pervasiveness of private security is intimately linked to the contemporary dominance of neo-liberal modes of governance (Johnston and Shearing 2003). Since the late 1970s, privatization, outsourcing, and public–private partnerships have become commonplace, as governments have sought to streamline “bloated” bureaucracies and tighten welfare budgets (Donahue 1989). The result has been a general move away from the vertically integrated, hierarchical, and state-centered structures of service provision characteristic of the welfare state, toward more diverse,

²This section draws on interviews with company officials. See also the respective companies’ websites.

horizontally linked complexes of actors (see Rose 1996; Kettl 2000; Kamensy and Burlin 2004). As its advocates argue, neo-liberalism promotes a form of networked governance and involves a shift toward a new model of government less involved in direct service provision, and more focused on managing and organizing devolved centers and resources (Goldsmith and Eggers 2004). In a metaphor often cited by criminologists, the role of the state has shifted from “rowing” toward “steering” (Osborne and Gaebler 1993). As part of this development, security functions previously regarded as the proper domain of the state, including prisons, prisoner transport, immigration control, and airport security, have been privatized and outsourced, and these shifts in governance and the ensuing proliferation of market opportunities are closely connected to the growth of private security (Johnston 1992; Button 2002; Wakefield 2003).³

While these shifts have empowered private actors, their growth cannot be seen as an automatic diminishment in the power of the state. Instead, as David Garland has indicated, in these new arrangements the private can often be seen as a “third sector” of security provision, operating alongside the policing and punitive institutions of the state. The result is a more “governmental” approach to security:

an enhanced network of more or less directed, more or less informal crime control, complementing and extending the formal controls of the criminal justice state. Instead of imagining that they can monopolize crime control, or exercising their sovereign powers in complete disregard of the powers of other actors, state agencies now adopt a strategic relation to other forces of social control. They seek to build broader alliances, enlisting the “governmental” powers of private actors, and shaping them to the ends of crime control. (Garland 2001:124; see also Simon 2007)

These transformations in public policy have been accompanied by changes in the socially dominant attitudes, norms and practices surrounding crime, punishment, and security (Johnston and Shearing 2003; Shearing and Wood 2007). In terms of crime and punishment, the 1970s marked the beginning of what has been termed the “crisis of penal modernism”: a widespread skepticism toward rehabilitative approaches to criminality, accompanied by the rise of more punitive approaches stressing the importance of incarceration and the tightening of parole provisions (Garland 2001:53–73). The resulting increase in incarceration required greater capacities in the prison system, and public authorities, influenced in part by the neoliberal ideas of New Public Management and declining public funds, reacted by creating ever more opportunities for the private sector, thus stimulating and encouraging the emergence of larger, better resourced, and more sophisticated private security providers.⁴

This increasingly punitive approach to crime also reflected profound changes in the predominant understandings of criminality. While in the 1970s a “welfarist” understanding of criminality as a product of deprivation or deviance predominated, this was gradually challenged by the ascendance of “economic” views of criminal behavior stressing rational calculation and opportunity structures as key variables. As a result, the welfarist component of public authorities’ responses to crime have been overlain with techniques of crime control based on efficiency, surveillance, and spatial design—a process that has further encouraged and legitimated the expanded role of private companies. As security has

³Diverse analyses are O’Malley and Palmer 1996; Jones and Newburn 1998; Loader 1999; Quinlan, Thomas, and Gautreaux 2001. After September 11, 2001, the United States returned airport security to the public sector. Private companies continue to play this role in Europe, under public supervision (Verkuil 2007:57–71).

⁴For example, between 1975 and 2000, the carceral population of the United States grew fivefold, from 379,393 to 1,931,850, with the private sector playing an increasing role. See Wacquant 2005:5, 10.

become less tightly identified with the direct and exclusive authority of state officials and instead seen as service that can be bought and sold on a free market, it has been in a specific way de-politicized and partially transformed from a political problem requiring welfarist social policy and state intervention to a technical problem amenable to private solution.

In this more market-oriented and individualized view of security, consumers are to a degree responsible for their own security, both in terms of their behavior and in terms of making provisions for their own protection (O'Malley and Palmer 1996; Loader 1999). The prevalence of risk-based thinking and security technologies is revealing in this context (Ericson and Haggerty 1997; Johnston and Shearing 2003). Risk is not simply a synonym for danger; it is a particular way of thinking about and responding to potential dangers. It is preventative, not restorative. Primarily actuarial and calculative, it works by designing and controlling spaces, through the collection of statistics and the production of categories of danger, and by surveillance. Risk is, therefore, a way of approaching security that can be deployed by private actors just as effectively as by public ones. It is also broadly universalizable—in principle applicable everywhere regardless of local conceptions of order and justice. As such, it further expands the field of action and impact for private security actors and contributes to the potential transnationalization of their skills and services.

Taken together, these interlinked processes have been central to the growth and globalization of private security, but while the implications of a more “pluralized” or “hybrid” security field have been extensively studied at the domestic level (Jones and Newburn 1998; Loader 1999; Johnston and Shearing 2003), little attention has been devoted to its global ramifications (Johnston 2000 and 2006). Yet these domestic transformations have provided the conditions for emergence of new transnational security structures. Spurred by the partial disassembly of the state in the security field, empowered by the importation of neo-liberal logics and by large-scale domestic security markets, PSCs have become well-resourced, corporate structures possessing the material and ideational capacities to operate on increasingly global scales. Their material capabilities are evident in the sheer size of the companies, and the financial, technological, and organizational resources they are able to mobilize. Equally important, however, are the ideational capacities fostered by transformations in the security field. Commodification constitutes security as a technique and a form of expert knowledge that, while specialized, is by no means the sole purview of public (or national) authorities, making PSCs legitimate experts in the technical and managerial dimensions of security provision, as well as in broader forms of risk analysis and intelligence.⁵

While security remains the prerogative of the state in many areas of policing, the capacity to cast security as a politically neutral service—a commodity—provided by the private sector allows global private security firms to draw upon logics of free trade to facilitate its entry into new markets, even where these are resisted by the host state. Tellingly, the World Trade Organization now often includes private security in the General Agreement on Trade in Services, thus providing a strong incentive for member states to allow free and fair competition in security services. Similarly, the EU has sought to promote free trade of security services across Europe as part of its Services Directive. In this way, in security, as in many other parts of the current global era, “private logics circulate through public institutional domains” (Sassen 2006:195), and these institutions, be they state ministries or international organizations, become powerful agents for the globalization of private security.

⁵Analysis of companies operating in the military sector include Avant (2005), Leander (2005), Leander and van Munster (2007).

Approaching security privatization in terms of broader processes of state disassembly and reassembly shows the weaknesses of situating private security actors in a zero-sum game of opposition to public power. While there is little doubt that private security may in certain settings be an indication of state weakness or pose a threat to the state, such interpretations overlook the manner in which the empowerment of private actors is directly linked to transformations inside the state and often takes place with the active endorsement and encouragement of state authorities. Rather than existing in opposition to the state, PSCs are often part of complex security networks that knit together public and private, global and local actors that cannot be neatly contained within national boundaries: a process of reassembly into what we call global security assemblages.

Needless to say, these transformations in governance are far from uniform, and differ across time and space. As such, our approach draws attention to the need for “grounded theory,” of investigation at the point where the global is inserted and translated into the local. In the following section, we analyze the position of private security in two global security assemblages: diamond mining in Sierra Leone, and oil extraction in Nigeria. Both countries figure prominently in the literature on military privatization, and are frequently used as examples of how private security actors erode the power of already weak states (Musah and Fayemi 2000; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2007). Against this familiar reading, we show how the activities of PSCs and their relationship to the state reflects their empowerment by shifts in security governance, as well as the increasing transnationalization of the African state (Callaghy, Kassimir, and Latham 2001). While private security has a long history in Africa, contemporary global security assemblages mark a significant transformation. In these assemblages, security is shaped and influenced by new normative orders beyond the nation-state and by the growing power of private actors who interact with the state to such a degree that it is often difficult to determine where the public ends and the private begins. Indeed, in these global security assemblages the very categories of public/private and global/local are being reconstituted and reconfigured in ways that may lack the drama of heavily armed “mercenaries,” but that nevertheless have important implications for security governance.

Global Security Assemblages: Two Cases⁶

Sierra Leone

Despite its small size, the highly publicized activities of Executive Outcomes and Sandline International have made Sierra Leone something of a paradigm case of security privatization (Musah and Fayemi 2000; Singer 2003; Avant 2005). Most analyzes, however, end with the denouement of the Sandline affair in 1997, and the post-conflict development of private security has gone almost totally unnoticed in both academic discussions and reconstruction policies. At the end of a war that killed over 75,000 people, maimed 10,000, and displaced more than half the population (Richards 1996; Abdulla 1997; Fanthorpe 2001; Gberie 2005), Sierra Leone became the target of an extensive international effort to reconstruct and reform its security sector. The country’s armed forces were in disarray, and deeply tainted by their involvement in human rights atrocities and economic looting. The numerous rebel armies, factions, and civil defense militias were similarly discredited. Throughout the country, police stations, posts, and barracks had been destroyed, and the police were widely seen as symbols of an oppressive state and lacked the trust and support of the public (Malan, Meek, Thusi,

⁶These sections draw on fieldwork in Sierra Leone and Nigeria, as well as interviews at company headquarters. For reasons of confidentiality, we do not name sources. In both countries, informal and nationally based private security actors also figure prominently, but are excluded from this analysis.

Ginifer, and Coker 2003). In other words, little by way of any credible and trustworthy security apparatus and framework existed, and Security Sector Reform (SSR) was deemed an essential aspect of the country's recovery.

The objective of the SSR program was to reconstruct a public monopoly of security, and little or no attention has been awarded to private security. Yet post-conflict Sierra Leone has seen an explosion of private security activities. Prior to the war, there were only two PSCs in the country. Now there are at least 30, perhaps as many as 50. No accurate employment figures exist, but the Office of National Security estimates total employment in the sector at approximately 3,000, while other sources suggest it may be as high as 4,000–5,000. By comparison, the Sierra Leone Police employs 9,300 persons, including some 2,000 support staff. There is a significant international presence in the sector; Group4Securicor has a number of important contracts, while some ex-UN peacekeepers as well as former operatives of Executive Outcomes remain active as employees, owners, or consultants. Although the post-conflict government in 2002 passed legislation that in principle allows PSCs to hold arms, this remains overruled by the UN arms embargo of October 1997, which prevents the sale of weapons to non-state actors. With one exception, private security in Sierra Leone is therefore unarmed, a situation that is strongly defended by most international development advisors involved in the country's SSR program (Abrahamsen and Williams 2006).

The aims of SSR aside, what has emerged in key areas of Sierra Leone is very far from a traditionally conceived security sector with the police at its center. Instead, the post-conflict period has seen the emergence of security networks involving a range of public, private, global and local actors, reflecting a shift in broader social forces. In a situation where the resources, expertise, and credibility of the public security forces are limited, private security firms have been able to use their new capacities—material resources, market legitimacy, technical expertise, global linkages, and claims of political neutrality—to wield significant influence within global security assemblages.

A striking example can be found in diamond mining and the company Koidu Holdings. The company is a subsidiary of DiamondWorks and Branch Energy, which have in the past been linked to Executive Outcomes. According to several accounts, EO's payment consisted in part of mineral concessions granted to its associated companies, most prominently Branch Energy and the Canadian-registered DiamondWorks (Musah 2002:912; Drohan 2003:216–41). The rights to the Koidu Holdings mine in Kono—the epicenter of the civil war—were obtained by Branch Energy under the National Provisional Revolutionary Council of Valentine Strasser in 1995, but operations were closed during the civil war. When the mine re-opened in 2003, it marked the return of corporate, kimberlite diamond mining to Sierra Leone where most diamond mining is alluvial and organized along informal, artisan lines. Accordingly, its success is regarded by the government and its donors as vital for restarting and renewing the sector along more regulated lines, and thus reducing the dynamics often seen as crucial in starting the conflict. It is also hoped that the company's success will increase export revenues, as well as Sierra Leone's attractiveness to foreign investors.

Historical connections aside, the three-tier security structure in operation at Koidu Holdings is noteworthy for its "assembled" character and its interweaving of public, private, global and local actors and normativities. The mine area is guarded by Group4Securicor (trading as SecuricorGray), which provides a force of 86 unarmed guards. In addition, Koidu Holdings has a dedicated armed police contingent of 23 officers from the Operations Support Division (OSD) of the Sierra Leone Police, who receive supplementary wages from the mining company. Overall supervision of security is in the hands of seven expatriate specialist

personnel employed directly by Koidu Holdings, all especially chosen for their previous direct combat experience, often from the conflict in Sierra Leone itself. The OSD is under the direct operational control of these in-house security specialists, who also accompany OSD officers on mobile patrols of the concession (patrols consist of one officer from Koidu Holdings and two from the OSD). SecuricorGray is also responsible, in co-ordination with armed OSD officers, for the security of diamonds when in transit from the mine to Freetown, and for their shipment from Sierra Leone to Antwerp.

In this global security assemblage, a hybrid structure of public and private, local and global security actors combine to facilitate economic activities aimed at a global market, deemed by both the government and international development donors as essential to state reconstruction and economic recovery. The assemblage represents a complex and multilayered arrangement in which global capital, transnational private security, state authorities, local police, and international police advisers are integrated in the planning and provision of security. Public police trained by international advisors and funded through development assistance are utilized for the exclusive protection of the private assets of a transnational corporation; they are paid supplementary wages and food allowances by foreign capital, and are under the supervision and to some degree command of private expatriate security operatives. While the police retain their formal authority and the monopoly of armed force, the practical coordination of their activities with those of the private security company is one of continual and often delicate negotiation. In other words, these are not clear-cut hierarchical or vertical relationships, where power and authority runs in only one direction, or from one particular and clearly defined center. Instead, the authority and goals of the state are routinely exercised and negotiated with those of private security providers and their clients.

In this relationship, the position of SecuricorGray and the in-house security personnel reflects their economic and technological superiority vis-à-vis an under-resourced and still distrusted police force. The legacy of the civil war and continuing skepticism toward the public police strengthen the influence of private security actors, as well as the bargaining power of foreign capital. Koidu Holdings regards the private management of its security as absolutely essential, as past policing failures and atrocities have left the company with lingering doubts about the police's capacity and reliability. It is highly unlikely that Koidu Holdings could (or would) operate without the deployment of global private security. In fact, the company lobbied the government in attempts to replicate the more militarized security characteristic of diamond mining in other parts of Africa, and has twice with the help of South African security consultants applied to arm its own internal security force. These applications were rejected, in decisions that were strongly influenced by international donors and especially the government's police and security advisors. However, drawing upon the expertise and resources provided by a global private security firm whose presence is legitimated by the empowerment of private security as a whole, the mining company has succeeded in achieving a partially privatized security environment. As such, the security structure at Koidu Holdings reflects a fluid situation, itself influenced by a combination of local and global actors and imperatives.

Rather than an exemplary case of private military activity, operating in the shadows of legality and undermining an already weak state (or supporting a "shadow state"), private security in contemporary Sierra Leone testifies to the existence of global assemblages. Within these settings, PSCs like SecuricorGray have a significant impact on the choice of security strategies, which in the case of Koidu Holdings have been informed by risk-based thinking and focused on minimizing the chances that diamonds are stolen, or that the mine's property is

in any way attacked by the surrounding local population.⁷ The security arrangement is, however, far from entirely private and the state retains a key role, both by setting the legal framework and integrating public forces into private security structures. That said, this legal framework is profoundly influenced by international development advisors, who have occupied key positions in the country's security institutions since the end of the civil war. Moreover, it is clear that the government regards private security as a means of exercising and consolidating its authority and legitimacy by supplying the conditions for foreign investment and economic growth. In this sense, private logics circulate through the Sierra Leonean state. Thus, while PSCs have certainly stepped into the breach created by the incapacity of the Sierra Leonean state, they cannot in any meaningful way be seen to undermine or supplant public authority. Rather the private security actors at Koidu Holdings are integrated into state-sanctioned structures, where the power and authority of private and public actors interact and combine to produce new institutions and practices that challenge the very categories of public/private and global/local. While clearly containing elements of the national, in terms of being embedded in a specific territory, drawing on particular laws and regulations, and leaving intact the state's monopoly of legitimate armed force, the security arrangement at Koidu Holding is simultaneously a complex assemblage of cross-border networks constituted by a variety of institutions, practices, and normativities that cannot be contained within the territorial boundaries of the nation-state.

Nigeria

The growing presence of private security in the volatile environment of the oil-rich Niger Delta provides another illustration of the significance of global security assemblages. West African oil is of increasing strategic importance, and Nigeria—the 11th largest oil producer in the world—is central in this regard. Yet escalating unrest and persistent violence in the Niger Delta has reduced the country's oil production by around a quarter, generating international concern and causing both the United States and the United Kingdom to increase their security involvement in the region (Lubeck, Watts, and Lipschutz 2007; Wallis and Green 2008).

The oil companies, and their installations and employees, are at the center of the Niger Delta's complex conflicts for a number of reasons.⁸ Oil production has caused widespread environmental damage and social dislocation, leading to protest and discontent among the affected local communities who reap few benefits from Nigeria's petroleum resources. Excluded from access to oil wealth, attacks on the companies and their property have become prime sources of income for some groups—for example through crude oil theft and intentional pipeline damage in order to get subsequent contracts for the repair and/or guarding of pipelines, or to receive compensation for oil spills. Over the years, the activities and practices of the oil companies have contributed to inter-communal conflict, as payments for land rent, contracts for informal security and protection services, compensations or other company benefits such as development programs and social funds have been unequally distributed and thus become spoils to be fought over. Moreover, the oil companies are targeted because of their perceived direct connections to and collusion with the Nigerian state, and they are often seen as the main point of pressure through which an

⁷Considerable controversy and conflict has surrounded the company's relationship with the local community, especially regarding the resettlement of people affected by mining activities. The mine was closed by the government for seven months following violent protests against the company in December 2007, when the police shot and killed two people.

⁸For accounts of the conflicts, see Frynas 2001; Okonta and Douglas 2003; Ukiwo 2007; Watts 2003. On private security in the area, Avant 2005:182–92.

unresponsive government might be influenced (Obi 2001; Omeje 2006). In recent years, these dynamics have been intensified by large-scale crude oil theft, or so-called illegal bunkering, with oil smuggling rings stealing the equivalent of approximately \$5 billion annually. Illegal bunkering and the rise of heavily armed militias, in all likelihood connected to political elites and the security forces, have contributed to an intensification of violence and criminalization in the region.

As a result, most activities associated with oil extraction in the Niger Delta take place in fortified enclaves; operations behind layers of barbed wire, staff inside gated compounds, transports with armed escorts. Other aspects of oil extraction and production are spread across thousands of square kilometers in the mangrove swamps and creeks of the Delta, and are practically impossible to secure. The risks to employees and equipment are very real, with frequent kidnappings and damage to company assets, in addition to ongoing violent clashes between opposing groups and between those groups and government forces. At the same time, there is little doubt that the extensive security presence in the region is in itself perceived as an aggressive and exclusionary act by many local people, and hence perpetuates an environment of hostility and violence.

In this setting, PSCs play increasingly prominent roles. According to the best informed estimates, there are currently between 1,500 and 2,000 PSCs in Nigeria, employing in excess of 100,000 people (Keku and Akingbade 2003). There is also an expanding presence of international security personnel and companies, with both Group4Securicor and several major risk and consultancy firms operating in the country. Like in Sierra Leone, private security actors operate in close relationship with public security forces, as virtually all levels of public force, including the military, have been integrated into the day-to-day security arrangements of the oil industry to a degree where it is often difficult to determine where public force ends and private security begins.

An excellent illustration of a global security assemblage operating in this setting is Group4Securicor's contract with Chevron Nigeria Ltd. (CNL), the most extensive PSC involvement in Nigeria's oil industry and one of Group4Securicor's biggest contracts on the African continent. Group4Securicor, through its subsidiary Outsourcing Services Ltd. (OSL), assumed the Chevron contract in October 2002, replacing a number of local companies that had previously provided manned guarding alongside the police. While the initial contract was for guarding at CNL's headquarters in Lagos, the two logistical bases in Port Harcourt and Warri, as well as the operational base in Escravos, OSL's engagement with Chevron has expanded significantly beyond traditional guarding activities. In total, OSL provides a security force of 1,200 persons for CNL, the third largest oil major in Nigeria, and OSL's operations are integrated in a complex and intricate assemblage with the various elements of the public security forces (see also Securicor 2004).

Private security in Nigeria is regulated by the *Private Guard Companies Act* (1986),⁹ which—as in Sierra Leone—prohibits PSCs from carrying firearms. However, given the generally high level of violence and insecurity in the country, Group4Securicor, like most leading companies, finds it necessary to offer armed protection for certain key contracts, as well as the possibility of armed response in cases of emergency. The solution comes in the form of co-operation with the Nigerian Police whereby members of the paramilitary Mobile Police (MoPol)—often armed with fully automatic weapons—are more or less permanently seconded to PSCs and integrated into their everyday operations. MoPol officers are paid supplementary wages by the companies, and are supervised by PSC officers, but continue in principle to take orders from their own commanders, thus creating a significant fusion of public and private authority and responsibility. In the

⁹*Private Guard Companies Act* (1986), Cap 367 Laws of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

case of OSL, a substantial number of MoPol officers are embedded within the company's security structures and plans both in Lagos and at the various locations in the Delta.

In their contract with Chevron, OSL's security personnel also cooperate extensively with the so-called Supernumary, or "Spy" police—officers recruited and trained by the Nigerian Police Force at the request of the oil companies and deployed as an unarmed police force (primarily for manned guarding) under the direct pay and control of the companies, and with police powers only on company property. As such, the Spy police are an interesting example of the mingling of public and private security forces. Their numbers are extensive: Chevron deploys approximately 250, having reduced the number following the contract with OSL, while Shell has 1,200 Spy police at its operations, including an intelligence unit, and ExxonMobile deploys between 700 and 1,000. As the security situation in the Niger Delta has intensified, the oil companies have also integrated armed components of the public police directly into their operations. These range from armed officers of the Nigerian Police Force, who also act as dog handlers in many operations, to the more heavily armed, paramilitary MoPol. Police and MoPol alike are paid a stipend by the companies, and are also sometimes provided with food and accommodation. Unlike the Spy police, however, the oil companies do not have direct control over these forces. While operational authority is in the hands of a senior company security official and police officers are instructed to comply with the oil company's "guidelines for the use of force" or "code of conduct," the Police have their own commanders and supervisors and receive their orders within this line of command while nevertheless participating in security operations alongside PSCs.

In addition, OSL security personnel interact on a daily basis with military Government Security Forces (GSF), that are also increasingly used to protect oil operations defined as national key assets. GSF are allocated directly to the oil companies, who pay an administrative fee to the Commander and a direct stipend, as well as food and accommodation, to the soldiers. The oil companies also frequently supply and maintain GSF equipment, vehicles, and boats. In highly conflictual situations, the GSF provide more direct protection at sites, such as flowstations and terminals, and the Navy is also used to supply operations in the swamp and offshore. In response to the deteriorating situation of the last few years, the number of GSF assigned to the various oil companies has increased.

OSL plays a central role in providing marine security for CNL, especially around Escravos, and its security officers interact closely with Navy personnel. The company is responsible for daily routine patrols both offshore and in the surrounding swamp's creeks and rivers. OSL boats also provide escort and protection for supply vessels, drilling rigs and work barges. In addition, Fast Response Craft armed with high-caliber machine guns are deployable at short notice in emergency cases, and in 2007 OSL acquired two high-speed patrol boats, thus further enabling the movement of armed rapid reaction force personnel. A satellite tracking system allows OSL's control room to follow the boats' movement through the narrow waterways around Escravos, providing constant surveillance and communications.

While OSL Mariners (usually ex-Navy personnel) operate and command the boats, each patrol vessel includes a contingent of Navy personnel. In day-to-day operations, the OSL Mariner is in control of the vessel, but authority passes to the senior GSF officer at the point when a "life threatening situation" develops. While the division of labor and authority between OSL and the GSF is in principle clearly outlined, the definition of "a life threatening situation" is not necessarily straightforward. The GSF retain ultimate authority, but they are to a significant extent embedded within structures, routines and procedures

developed by OSL and CNL.¹⁰ As G4S puts it in one of its own publications, “OSL also liaises between the Nigerian security forces and CNL, a delicate task requiring a high degree of cultural sensitivity and diplomatic skills” (Greenwood 2008:18).

A similar fusion of public and private security is found in the physical protection of Chevron’s primary production facility at Escravos. The facility has been subject to a number of attempted “site invasions” by local communities with grievances against the company, the government, or both, and at times such protests have caused evacuations of personnel and succeeded in closing production. Following its appointment by Chevron in 2002, OSL designed and implemented strategies to counter such events, incorporating both private security personnel and the Spy and Mobile Police. The training of public forces as part of this “quick response force” is provided and conducted by OSL officers, and in case of an “invasion” public police will operate within the structures devised by a global private security company, not by their local commanders, and they will act side by side with private security officers.

Despite its unarmed status, private security exercises a fundamental impact on the security situation in the Niger Delta, providing technology, expertise, and expatriate personnel that substantially influence the practices of public security forces, as well as providing capabilities that would otherwise be absent. Once again, in this setting private security is not simply a junior partner to the state, but is instead a key component in the operations of state forces. This is further supplemented by integrating former Nigerian Navy commanders directly into both the security operations of CNL and the OSL. A network of international oil companies, global private security advisors, and ex- and serving Nigerian military personnel thus underpins the public-private/global-local security structures at work,¹¹ and private security in the Niger Delta plays an important role in securing not only the operations of the oil companies but also, by extension, the authority of the Federal government which depends upon income from those operations. What we are witnessing then, it not so much a straightforward erosion of public authority, but rather a re-articulation of public/private, global/local distinctions and relations.

In the Niger Delta, as in Sierra Leone, private security actors also have an important impact on the overall security strategies adopted. In the past, the oil companies at the very least tolerated, and in some eyes promoted, the highly coercive security strategies of the Nigerian police and military (Okonta and Douglas 2003; Meier 2004). There are now signs that companies are seeking (at least in part) to abandon such strategies and to distance themselves from the coercion of public security services, in recognition of the failure of these policies and the considerable international opposition and negative publicity they have generated. Instead, the oil companies are adopting more “comprehensive” security strategies incorporating community engagement and development (Omeje 2006; SPDC 2002). While the depth of this commitment remains questionable and largely untested, it is clear that the use of private security consultants and companies offers the oil companies the capacity to manage their security arrangements and the activities of the GSF more directly. As two senior officials of CNL put it, “OSL helps discipline the GSF.” Through the employment of OSL, Chevron thus to some extent

¹⁰This structure also reflects the embedding of the security network within the normative constraints provided by the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, to which Chevron subscribes. The principles favor unarmed private security and restraints on the use of force by public authorities. See www.voluntaryprinciples.org.

¹¹Similar networks can be seen at Shell Nigeria where, for example, the Head of Security is a former Director of the Nigerian State Security Service.

influences both the security forces directly assigned to them, and to a lesser degree those of the Nigerian state more broadly. By partially embedding state security forces within the structures provided by Group4Securicor and the material and technical capabilities they provide, international oil companies may be able to influence security structures and strategies in much more direct ways than in situations where the monopoly of public security provision is stronger.

Private Security and Global Governance

Although the role of private actors in global governance has been a central focus for research in IR in recent years, private security actors have been largely excluded from this literature.¹² A major reason for this neglect lies in the tendency to treat security privatization as separate from and even in opposition to more “legitimate” transformations in structures of authority and governance in the international system. In an important early contribution to the study of non-state actors in global governance, for example, Rodney Hall and Thomas Bierstecker argued that while private security actors certainly exercise authority, it should be viewed as “illicit.” Distinguishing between power and authority on the grounds that the latter is recognized and legitimated through norm-based consent, and defining private security as “private authority associated with organized violence,” they argue that “the form of private authority exercised by mafias and mercenaries” is “‘illicit’ authority because the activities of these groups violate domestic and international legal norms,” even if “these groups often enjoy a legitimate social recognition to the extent that they step into a power vacuum left by a weak state and provide goods that the state fails to provide” (Hall and Bierstecker 2002:16). These points are important, particularly in relation to the activities of PMCs, and in situations such as Sierra Leone in the 1990s. As we have shown, however, much of contemporary security privatization raises very different questions and challenges, and to continue to see it in these terms blinds us to the ways that PSCs are entwined with shifts in internationally accepted practices of security governance, not opposed to them.

This is especially important as the equation of private security with “mercenaries” and illicit activities continues to have widespread currency. It colors, for example, the place allotted to security in one of the few analyses of public-private partnerships in IR. As we have shown, the partial disassembly of the state has been a central factor in the growth of the private security sector, and hence it would appear a likely candidate for inclusion in discussions of the shifting nature of public-private relations. But yet again, the tendency to treat security privatization as inherently illicit, and to associate it with mercenaries and the privatized military, leads Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse to treat security privatization as both marginal and as *outside* the broader legitimated processes of public-private partnerships. In their words:

In rare circumstances, core state functions, such as the monopoly on the legitimate use of force, are delegated to private actors. Many weak Third World governments are no longer able to provide national security for their citizens and have started to contract out military security to private firms such as Executive Outcomes, a modern-day mercenary group. The privatization of security and defence policy, however, appears to be rare and is usually closely scrutinized by other states, including Western powers. (Börzel and Risse 2005:202)

¹²On the growing significance of private actors in IR, see Cutler, Haufler, and Porter (1999); Hall and Bierstecker (2002); Karsent and Schneider (2000); a call to include these themes in studies of private security is Avant (2005: conclusion).

Such a representation is deeply misleading. As we have demonstrated, security privatization is neither “rare,” nor limited to “weak Third World governments,” where it is in any case only very infrequently outsourced in the fashion suggested—and certainly not to Executive Outcomes, which disbanded in 1999. Instead, security privatization and complex public–private arrangements in the security field are ubiquitous in the modern world—so much so that far from being “closely scrutinized” by either Western governments or scholars they are taken for granted to a point where they are almost invisible.

Far from being illicit, the operations of PSCs arise from foundational shifts in governance at both the national and international levels and are deeply embedded in contemporary public security structures and global norms. The result has been the emergence of global security assemblages, where security is increasingly de-linked from the exclusive monopoly of the state. In this sense, the state becomes a “node” (Johnston and Shearing 2003) in a broader network of power and authority that extends beyond the national territory. As we have shown in both Sierra Leone and in Nigeria, it is important to guard against the misleading conclusion that security privatization necessarily marks a straightforward erosion of state authority. It is instead, indicative of a broader transformation in the form and exercise of public as well as private power. This in turn draws attention to the need to theorize and investigate empirically the points at which the global is historically situated and is made socially specific. This is particularly the case in global security assemblages in states with weak administrative or governing capacities, where the state’s financial, managerial, and technical resources are often surpassed by PSCs, corporate capital or development organizations. In such cases, the role of private security within global security assemblages can often be seen as crucial to both the continued functioning of state authority and the operations of international capital.

Seeing global PSCs in this light has important implications for understanding the relationship between security governance and the forms of power operating in contemporary global governance. In particular, it highlights the relationship between what Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall term “compulsory” power (the direct, often coercive, capacity to control the actions of others) and the forms of “productive” power marked by the constitution of specific types of actors capable of effective action within a given social domain. The virtue of a multiple conception of power is that, in their words, it allows us to “consider how productive power makes some instances of compulsory power possible and legitimate, and, in turn, how compulsory power shapes the terms of meaning that influence how actors see what is possible and desirable” (Barnett and Duvall 2005:44).

Global private security firms provide an excellent illustration of precisely these processes. Empowered by shifts in security governance, bolstered by the development of ideational and material capacities, and operating in coordination with public forces, PSCs are both a *result* or effect of productive power, and agents *of* productive power in specific sites. Their presence is a result of shifts in security governance, but they are also agents that act to produce forms of security governance through their own coercive capacities and their ability (or attempts) to influence how other security actors “see what is possible and desirable.” This influence includes not only their clients, but also in some cases the compulsory power of public forces.

The Niger Delta provides a good illustration. Participation in the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights has become a mark of a “socially responsible” firm, something that is the result of broader global pressures and a reflection of new security strategies adopted by the oil companies. PSCs are a key part of this form of governance, as they provide the companies with expert agents who can attempt to refashion the subjectivities of state security providers (the GSF) at the same time as they enhance the compulsory powers of the

companies and the GSF by integrating transnational expertise and resources in to the coercive capacities operating in the area.

However, while private security actors may be legitimated within global practices and integrated within state structures, this by no means implies that their activities will be perceived as legitimate and beneficial in specific local contexts. In both Sierra Leone and Nigeria, their activities are often experienced by many members of the local population as aggressive, disempowering, and exclusionary. Indeed, in the absence of a responsive state that addresses the fundamental grievances of people in the region, the actions of global PSCs may serve to consolidate productive enclaves whose economic benefits escape the local populations that surround them, and the capacities of private security companies may thus contribute to a continuation of the sources of instability and conflict. Put differently, while global security assemblages may enhance the state's economic and security capacities, this does not necessarily mean that they strengthen the state in a broader sense. In this regard, they are indicative of how in the current global era, private logics frequently circulate through public domains.

Approached from the perspective of transformations in governance, it is clear that the deterritorialization of governance witnessed in many aspects of contemporary international politics has also taken place in the field of security. Security governance, in the sense of the authoritative setting and enforcement of collective norms, now increasingly transcends the nation-state and includes private actors in extensive and influential roles. Contemporary global security assemblages mark the emergence of new security institutions and practices that are simultaneously global and local, public and private, and that draw on a broad range of capacities and discourses for their empowerment. In short, security governance is increasingly beyond the state, embedded in a complex transnational security architecture that is both a reflection and a significant component of the shifting structures of global governance.

References

- ABDULLA, IBRAHIM. (1997) Bush Path to Destruction: The Origin and Character of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF-SL). *Africa Development* 22(3/4): 45–76.
- ABRAHAMSEN, RITA, AND MICHAEL C. WILLIAMS. (2006) Security Sector Reform: Bringing the Private In. *Conflict, Security and Development* 6(1): 1–23.
- AVANT, DEBORAH. (2005) *The Market for Force*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- BARNETT, MICHAEL, AND RAYMOND DUVAL. (2005) Power in International Politics. *International Organization* 59(1): 39–75.
- BÖRZEL, TANJA. A., AND THOMAS RISSE. (2005) Public-Private Partnerships: Effective and Legitimate Tools of Transnational Governance? In *Complex Sovereignty*, edited by E. Grande, and L. Pauley. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, pp. 195–216.
- BUTTON, MARK. (2002) *Private Policing*. London: Willan.
- CALLAGHY, THOMAS, RONALD KASSIMIR, AND ROBERT LATHAM (Eds.). (2001) *Intervention and Transnationalism in Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- CUTLER, A. CLAIRE, VIRGINIA HAUFLE, AND TONY PORTER (Eds.). (1999) *Private Authority and International Affairs*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- DONAHUE, JOHN D. (1989) *The Privatization Decision: Public Ends, Private Means*. New York: Basic Books.
- DROHAN, MADELEINE. (2003) *Making a Killing*. Toronto: Random House.
- ERICSON, RICHARD V., AND KEVIN D. HAGGERTY. (1997) *Policing the Risk Society*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- FANTHORPE, RICHARD. (2001) Neither Citizen Nor Subject? 'Lumpen' Agency and the Legacy of Native Administration in Sierra Leone. *African Affairs* 100(400): 363–386.
- FRYNAS, JEDRZEJ G. (2001) Corporate and State Responses to Anti-oil Protests in the Niger Delta. *African Affairs* 100(398): 27–54.
- GARLAND, DAVID. (2001) *The Culture of Control*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- GBERIE, LANSANA. (2005) *A Dirty War in West Africa: The RUF and the Destruction of Sierra Leone*. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
- GOLDSMITH, STEPHEN, AND WILLIAM D. EGGERS. (2004) *Governing by Network: The New Shape of the Public Sector*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
- GOUNEV, PHILIP. (2006) Bulgaria's Private Security Industry. In *Private Actors in Security Governance*, edited by A. Bryden, and M. Caparini. Berlin: LitVerlag, pp. 109–128.
- GREENWOOD, GAVIN. (2008) The Thin Black Line. *G4S International* June: 17–20.
- HALL, RODNEY BRUCE, AND THOMAS J. BIERSTECKER (Eds.). (2002) *The Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- JOHNSTON, LES. (1992) *The Rebirth of Private Policing*. London: Routledge.
- JOHNSTON, LES. (2000) Transnational Private Policing. In *Issues in Transnational Policing*, edited by J. W. E. Sheptycki. London: Routledge, pp. 21–42.
- JOHNSTON, LES. (2006) Transnational Security Governance. In *Democracy, Society and the Governance of Security*, edited by J. Wood, and B. Dupont. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 33–51.
- JOHNSTON, LES, AND CLIFFORD SHEARING. (2003) *Governing Security*. London: Routledge.
- JONES, TIM, AND TIM NEWBURN. (1998) *Private Security and Public Policing*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- JONES, TIM, AND TIM NEWBURN. (2006) The United Kingdom. In *Plural Policing: A Comparative Perspective*, edited by T. Jones, and T. Newburn. London: Routledge, pp. 34–54.
- KAMENSY, JOHN M., AND THOMAS J. BURLIN. (2004) *Collaboration: Using Networks and Partnerships*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
- KARSENT, RONIT, AND VOLKER SCHNEIDER (Eds.). (2000) *Private Organizations in Global Politics*. London: Routledge.
- KEKU, PATRICK, AND TUNDE AKINGBADE. (2003) *Industrial Security in Nigeria*. Lagos: Authorhouse.
- KETTL, DONALD F. (2000) *The Global Public Management Revolution: A Report on the Transformation of Governance*. Washington, DC: Brookings.
- LEANDER, ANNA. (2005) The Power to Construct International Security: On the Significance of Private Military Companies. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 33(3): 803–826.
- LEANDER, ANNA, AND RENS VAN MUNSTER. (2007) Private Security Contractors in the Debate about Darfur: Reflecting and Reinforcing Neo-Liberal Governmentality. *International Relations* 21(2): 201–216.
- LOADER, IAN. (1999) Consumer Culture and the Commodification of Policing and Security. *Sociology* 33(2): 373–392.
- LOADER, IAN. (2000) Plural Policing and Democratic Governance. *Social and Legal Studies* 9(3): 323–345.
- LUBECK, PAUL M., MICHAEL J. WATTS, AND RONNIE LIPSCHUTZ. (2007) *Convergent Interests: U.S. Energy Security and the 'Securing' of Nigerian Democracy*. Washington, DC: Center for International Policy.
- MALAN, MARK, SARAH MEEK, THOKOZANI THUSI, JEREMY GINIFER, AND PATRICK COKER. (2003) *Sierra Leone: Building the Road to Recovery*. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.
- MANCINI, FRANCESCO. (2006) *In Good Company: The Role of Business in Security Sector Reform*. London: Demos.
- MANNING, PETER K. (2006) The United States of America. In *Plural Policing: A Comparative Perspective*, edited by Trevor Jones and Tim Newburn. London: Routledge, pp. 98–125.
- MEIER, KARL. (2004) Shell 'Feeds' Nigeria Conflict, May End Onshore Work. *The Nigerian Village Square*. Available at <http://www.nigerianvillagesquare1.com>, accessed November 21, 2005.
- MUSAH, ABDEL-FATAU. (2002) The Privatization of Security, Arms Proliferation and the Process of State Collapse in Africa. *Development and Change* 33(5): 911–933.
- MUSAH, ABDEL-FATAU, AND J. 'KAYODE FAYEMI (Eds.). (2000) *Mercenaries: An African Security Dilemma*. London: Pluto.
- NDLOVU-GATSHENI, SABELO J. (2007) Weak States and the Growth of the Private Security Sector in Africa: Whither the African State. In *Private Security in Africa*, edited by S. Gumedze. Pretoria: Institute of Security Studies, pp. 17–38.
- O'MALLEY, PAT, AND DAREN PALMER. (1996) Post-Keynesian Policing. *Economy and Society* 25(2): 137–155.
- OBI, CYRIL. (2001) Global, State and Local Intersections: Power, Authority, and Conflict in the Niger Delta Oil Communities. In *Intervention and Transnationalism in Africa*, edited by T. Callaghy, R. Kassimir, and R. Latham. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 173–196.
- OKONTA, IKE, AND ORONTO DOUGLAS. (2003) *Where Vultures Feast*. London: Verso.
- OMEJE, KENNETH. (2006) *High Stakes and Stakeholders. Oil Conflict and Security in Nigeria*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- OSBORNE, DAVID, AND TED GAEBLER. (1993) *Reinventing Government*. New York: Plume.

- PETRIE, ANNE. (2008) Top Security, *Business Voice*, April, pp. 34–38. Available at http://www.g4s.com/top_security-business_voice_april_2008.pdf. (Accessed November 28).
- QUINLAN, J. MICHAEL, CHARLES W. THOMAS, AND SHERRIL GAUTREUX. (2001) The Privatization of Correctional Facilities. In *Privatizing Governmental Functions*, edited by Deborah Ballati. New York: Law Journal Press.
- RICHARDS, PAUL. (1996) *Fighting for the Rainforest: War, Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone*. Oxford: James Currey.
- ROSE, NIKOLAS. (1996) Governing 'Advanced' Liberal Democracies. In *Foucault and Political Reason*, edited by A. Barry, T. Osborne, and N. Rose. London: UCL Press, pp. 37–64.
- SASSEN, SASKIA. (2006) *Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- SECURICOR. (2004) Focus on Nigeria. *Securicor Magazine* (May): 38–42.
- SECURITAS. (2007) *The Security Market*. Available at <http://www.securitas.com>. (Accessed June 18, 2007).
- SHEARING, CLIFFORD D., AND PHILIP C. STENNING. (1981) Modern Private Security: Its Growth and Implications. In *Crime and Justice – An Annual Review of Research*, edited by M. Tonry and M. Norval. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. pp. 193–245.
- SHEARING, CLIFFORD, AND JENNIFER WOOD. (2007) *Imagining Security*. London: Willan.
- SIMON, JONATHAN. (2007) *Governing Through Crime*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- SINGER, PETER W. (2003) *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- SPDC. (2002) 2001 People and the Environment Annual Report. Lagos: SPDC.
- UKIWO, UKOHA. (2007) From 'Pirates' to Militants: A Historical Perspective on Anti-State and Anti-Oil Company Mobilization among the Ijaw of Warri, Western Niger Delta. *African Affairs* 106(425): 587–610.
- VERKUIL, PAUL. (2007) *Outsourcing Sovereignty*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- VOLKOV, VADIM. (2002) *Violent Entrepreneurs: The Use of Force in the Making of Russian Capitalism*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- WACQUANT, LOIC. (2005) The Great Penal Leap Backward: Incarceration in America from Nixon to Clinton. In *The New Punitiveness*, edited by J. Pratt, D. Brown, S. Hallsworth and M. Brown. London: Willan, pp. 3–26.
- WAKEFIELD, ALISON. (2003) *Selling Security: The Private Policing of Public Space*. London: Willan.
- WALLIS, WILLIAM, AND MATTHEW GREEN. (2008) UK and Nigeria Aim to Stop Oil Theft. *Financial Times* July 15 (<http://www.ft.com>), accessed July 28, 2008.
- WATTS, MICHAEL. (2003) Development and Governmentality. *Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography* 24(1): 6–34.
- WATTS, MICHAEL. (2004) Resource Curse? Governmentality, Oil and Power in the Niger Delta, Nigeria. *Geopolitics* 9(1): 50–80.
- WOOD, JENNIFER, AND NANCY CARDIA. (2006) Brazil. In *Plural Policing. A Comparative Perspective*, edited by T. Jones, and T. Newburn. London: Routledge, pp. 139–168.
- YOSHIDA, NAOKO, AND FRANK LEISHMAN. (2006) Japan. In *Plural Policing. A Comparative Perspective*, edited by T. Jones, and T. Newburn. London: Routledge, pp. 222–238.

Copyright of International Political Sociology is the property of Blackwell Publishing Limited and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.