

# WHITE WORLD ORDER, BLACK POWER POLITICS

THE BIRTH OF AMERICAN  
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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# Introduction

## A Mongrel American Social Science

—Since its inception, American social science has been closely bound up with American Negro destiny.

—Ralph Ellison, “American Dilemma”

—What is this thing called International Relations in the “English speaking countries” other than the “study” about how to “run the world from positions of strength”? In other places, at other times, it might be something else, but within those states which had the influence—as opposed to those that did not—it was little more than a rationalization for the exercise of power by the dominant nations over the weak.

There was no “science of International Relations” . . . The subject so-called was an ideology of control masking as a proper academic discipline.

—E. H. Carr, “Introduction” to  
*The Twenty Years’ Crisis*

In the first decades of the twentieth century in the United States, international relations meant race relations. This sentence is bound to strike many readers as both strange and wrong, just as it once did me. The problem of empire or imperialism, sometimes referred to as “race subjection,” was what preoccupied the first self-identified professors of international relations. They wrestled with the prospect that a race war might lead to the end of the world hegemony of whites, a future that appeared to many to be in the offing. The scholars had also identified the epicenter of the global biological threat in the three square miles or so at the northern end of Manhattan borough known as Harlem.

Each of these claims at first presentation seems false because 100 years later, a new common sense has taken hold. Today, professors teach that international relations is the scientific study of the interaction among “states” (or “countries” to the uninitiated), with other, lesser “actors” trailing behind. They also speak more abstractly about study of the “state system.”<sup>1</sup> Students interested in race relations look elsewhere in course catalogs and to other experts and departments.<sup>2</sup> So too do those wanting to learn about empires,

because imperialism is a thing of the past for social scientists. And no one thinks of Harlem as the capital of a country, so it has no standing in any contemporary understanding of international relations.<sup>3</sup>

In African American studies, meanwhile, together with those parts of the humanities and human sciences most impacted by the field's emergence in the 1960s–1970s, scholars study the Harlem Renaissance, which is a shorthand for the remarkable movement of intellectual and cultural self-determination that in the 1920s had white scholars scrambling to head off the end days. Many of the thinkers most closely associated with the movement taught at Howard University in Washington, D.C. The 250-acre campus in the northwest sector of the nation's capital with its Harvard- and Chicago-trained star faculty remains terra incognita in all standard accounts of the discipline of international relations in the United States. This last fact may prove the most discomfiting one in the years ahead.

When we follow the archival record to places beyond Hyde Park, Harvard Square, and Morningside Heights, the central repositories of America's "national" international relations history, to Sugar Hill in Harlem (a mile or so from Columbia University but a world away, judging from our maps of intellectual fields); the District of Columbia's Shaw neighborhood; Port of Spain, Trinidad; Camden, United Kingdom; and Accra, Ghana, it is as if we've left behind one field of study and intellectual disputation and wandered into another that is both wholly separate and intimately related. For convenience, call that field the history of "black internationalism." A central debate in that field concerns the Cold War's impact on the U.S. "long" civil rights movement, with its roots in the Harlem Renaissance, and on the academic enterprise we know as African American studies.<sup>4</sup>

What *White World Order, Black Power Politics* shows is that the intellectual entanglements in Morningside Heights and Sugar Hill are part of a common and complicated history. The project of liberation was from its inception (and by necessity) a world-spanning political and theoretical movement in response to the theory and practice of white supremacy. What is new and important in this book is the discovery that the intellectuals, institutions, and arguments that constituted international relations were shaped by and often directly concerned with advancing strategies to preserve and extend that hegemony against those struggling to end their subjection. The new science emerged as a key supplier of intellectual rationales for the political class long before the Cold War—in fact, for the entirety of the long American imperial century.<sup>5</sup> This discovery upends our commonplace understandings of international relations and U.S. foreign policy.

In this book I trace developments in the history of academic institutions and the politics of academic life not as if they constitute a cloistered world (the “ivory tower”), but as an important part of the history of the United States in the world. It is effectively a sequel to my last book, *America’s Kingdom*, about the unbroken past of hierarchy on the world’s mining frontiers.<sup>6</sup> There I used company and State Department records to show that the story that the private-owned giant Arabian American Oil Company told about its alleged commitment to developing Saudi Arabia’s human capital—one that scholars continued to reproduce unreflectively decades later—was a myth. Similarly, the private papers of professors, journals, research centers, and foundations reveal a story fundamentally at odds with established belief, even if some still consider the oil sector to be orders of magnitude more important to the twentieth century than the knowledge industry. Yes, academics who first defined their subject matter as international relations in the period 1900–1910 were never satisfactorily practical enough to suit the statesmen (and they were all men back then). Policymakers thought the same about most of a later, somewhat better-known, cast of action intellectuals who had occasional walk-on roles in our histories of the Cold War—the George Kennans, Hans Morgenthau, Walt Rostows, William Kaufmanns, Bernard Brodies, and so on. This tendency on the part of statesmen and politicians to dismiss the value of scholars and their theories continued in the post-1945 era even as the expanding national security state drew increasing numbers of new and rebranded experts on peace and war, defense strategy, and foreign policy into its orbit. Meanwhile, the critics of U.S. Cold War policy considered the various strategic studies institutes, centers, schools, and so forth at the head of the newly commissioned, government-subsidized academic armada to be nothing less than a full-fledged service arm of the empire.<sup>7</sup> The influence of a discipline and its reigning ideas entails more than the extent to which some professor has the ear of the prince or research findings contribute to policy.

Colleges and universities are crucial, obviously, to the continuous reproduction of our everyday ways of thinking, speaking, and writing about world politics, ways that are recognizable not only to the miniscule readership of scholarly journals such as *International Security* and *International Organization* but also to those who read (or write for) the *New York Times* and *Foreign Affairs* or who watch (or appear on) *PBS News Hour* and the *Daily Show*: imagine all those graduates of the Baby Boom— and Cold War—driven years of expansion in American higher education who studied or majored in the subject en route to careers as attorneys, journalists, researchers, writers, teachers, consultants, chief executive officers, department of defense analysts,

legislators, staffers, generals, presidential advisors, secretaries of state, and, not least, professors. Henry Kissinger (PhD Harvard 1954), Madeline Albright (PhD Columbia, 1976), and Condoleezza Rice (PhD University of Denver 1981), among many other notables, all studied and taught international relations prior to their years in the White House and leadership positions in the State Department.<sup>8</sup> Fareed Zakaria, the 28-year-old who oversaw a major facelift of the magazine *Foreign Affairs* prior to his star turn at *Newsweek*, *Time*, and CNN, is another PhD (Harvard 1993) in the “realist tradition” as he put it, of “international relations history and theory.”<sup>9</sup> The alumni list is almost impossibly long, and their influence, although hard to measure, is real.

Think back to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 (or for that matter to NATO’s intervention in Bosnia in 1993) for evidence of the ways undergraduate lecture and graduate comprehensive exam categories inform debates in the public sphere. Antagonists then routinely identified (or derided their opponents) as Kissingerian “realists” or Wilsonian “idealists.” Others claimed that positions on questions of war and peace in the post-9/11 era no longer corresponded to these old ideological constructs (or, as students learn to refer to them, theories, theoretical traditions, or paradigms).<sup>10</sup> Recall, too, the wide play given in the mid-2000s and after to the idea of “soft power.” Harvard’s Joseph Nye (PhD Harvard 1964), a onetime student of Pan Africanism now judged among the top four or five or six most influential thinkers in the discipline, had coined the term a decade earlier in *Bound to Lead* (1990), and he hit it big after rolling it out a second time in *Soft Power* (2004).<sup>11</sup> Similarly, *Clash of Civilizations* (1996), a book by his late colleague Samuel Huntington (Ph.D. Harvard 1950), Zakaria’s dissertation supervisor, sold in greater numbers and presumably earned the author a far greater advance than is typical for a book traded on the academic market.<sup>12</sup> People inside and outside the Washington, D.C., beltway certainly acted as if these books matter.

This is not to begrudge them, by the way. They represent a long tradition of what Bruce Kuklick calls the discipline’s “intellectual middlemen” who are skilled at getting ideas across to nonacademic audiences in Washington, New York, and points beyond.<sup>13</sup> Intellectuals played this role long before the Cold War, and it is hardly surprising to find them rediscovering and recycling ideas from earlier years. For example, *Clash of Civilizations* resembles the earlier, arguably more influential, and no less sensational *The Rising Tide of Color: The Threat against White World Supremacy* (1920) by one of Huntington’s forebears, T. Lothrop Stoddard (PhD Harvard 1916). Stoddard wrote his dissertation under Archibald Cary Coolidge (PhD Freiburg 1892), the founding editor of *Foreign Affairs*. Stoddard also provided one of the first analyses I know of America’s soft power, but his many works on international affairs

are all but unknown now. Huntington and Nye (among others) reprise the intellectual middleman's role and also reanimate the arguments of an earlier, not very well known era when biological racism and resource imperialism shaped the discipline and, not coincidentally, the policies of successive U.S. administrations. That history is critical to recovering the ideas of what I call the Howard school of international relations theory, whose leading thinkers alone evinced a commitment to understanding and writing about white world supremacy from the standpoint of its victims.

## International Relations 101

The problem, we now know in large part thanks to historians and sociologists of science, is that scholars reliably produce unreliable accounts of the past of their own fields.<sup>14</sup> International relations is no exception.<sup>15</sup> American schoolchildren learn the story of the midnight ride of Paul Revere together with any number of other myths about “the nation's origins, achievements, and destiny.”<sup>16</sup> Such myths function to produce a common consciousness and obscure the existence of hierarchy. The practitioner histories of international relations in the United States do roughly the same thing to the same end through the socialization of graduate students in the rituals of PhD programs and through lecture courses that pass on the discipline's invented traditions and escape from knowledge to generations of undergraduates who will become public intellectuals, politicians, and policymakers.

Every year thousands of undergraduates across the United States sign up for a class titled “Introduction to International Relations.” In the first week or two they learn that three broad rival theoretical traditions vie for explanatory primacy among specialists. The first (and it is always first) among unequals is “realism.” The second is “liberalism” or “liberal internationalism.” The third is “constructivism” (thirty years ago it was “neo-Marxism”), a kind of residual category that consists of various persuasions of critics on the discipline's margins, the serious consideration of which is honored more in the breach than in the observance.

For self-identified “realists,” the struggle for power among states is a law operating across space and time, one that statesmen in antiquity or their later chroniclers discovered and that their descendants discount at their (and our) peril. Instructors might drive the lesson home for undergraduates by assigning a fragment of the *History of the Peloponnesian War* by Athenian general and historian Thucydides (ca. 460–395 BCE) that is known as the Melian dialogue to demonstrate the timelessness of realism's truth about power politics: “The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.”<sup>17</sup>

Who teaches these introductory classes? The professors at the podiums in the large lecture halls are more often than not freshly minted PhDs and new assistant professors, while those who run the small discussion sections—if the undergraduates are lucky enough to have them—are first- and second-year graduate students. An even more reliable generalization is that all those young professors and graduate students in the intro courses will be white. The key point, however, is that these professors and would-be professors have committed vast amounts of their time and energy in an intensive period of immersion in the discipline and its literature. It is any academic profession's primary method for passing on its origin story in the guise of a canon of theories and theorists.

That is, the chains of transmission of the classical beliefs from Thucydides and their transubstantiation into theories by his putative intellectual heirs come to comprise the organizing framework and content of all those intro courses, the undergraduate version a stripped-down version of what is taught to the graduate students. The new professors will design their first stand-alone classes based on the ones for which they served as teaching assistants, which are based on the ones their own professors served as teaching assistants for slightly longer ago at one of the twenty to thirty research universities that reproduce the professoriate (and, increasingly, produce faculty outside the tenure system) across the country. Little wonder, then, that the syllabi all tend to look the same.<sup>18</sup> Identification of and with a tradition helps to make the discipline something more than a collection of professors and graduate students, blogs, journals, annual conventions, PhD qualifying exam reading lists, and anxieties of the moment. Just as inevitably, however, disciplining of this kind shifts one's critical gaze away from the complicated history of the development and transmission of what more often than not are fables of origin.<sup>19</sup>

Consider a heretofore-unrecognized puzzle that emerges from the archive of model syllabi, textbooks, and surveys of teaching and research in international relations that was beginning to be compiled and published in the mid-1920s, which reflected the accumulation of knowledge under the then-new rubric for the previous ten to fifteen years.<sup>20</sup> None of those long-forgotten authors and advocates for recognition of a new interdisciplinary specialization described anything remotely like a continuous tradition traceable to the ancients. To do so would hardly have aided the legitimacy of a claim of autonomy for their new enterprise and its specialized object of knowledge. The pattern is in fact common to academic specializations of all kinds that emerged later in the twentieth century, from art history and literary criticism to cultural anthropology and area studies.<sup>21</sup>

In the case of international relations, conditions changed after World War II. Although international relations professors continued to express anxieties in the 1950s and 1960s about the identity of field as a “real” discipline—presidents of the 50-year-old American Political Science Association (APSA) were still having trouble specifying precisely how their work differed from that of sociologists, psychologists, anthropologists, economists, and even historians—international relations was no longer in need of defense within the postwar university. The Cold War was all the justification the discipline required. It is during this new moment of relative disciplinary security that a new cohort, in the course of seeking to establish its own hegemony, began a process by which they elided “the historical boundary between the era of the research university and the pre-professional era.”<sup>22</sup> The professors have not looked back since—at least not without blinders on.

Today, unaware of the history of its early decades, a new generation of specialists in international relations in the United States since the 1950s practice their craft under the sway of two entwined myths of empire. The first is the idea that the United States is not and never was (much of) an imperial power. The second is that the discipline itself has never showed much interest in the study of imperialism. The first idea is, to my thinking, an example of willful ignorance in the face of much devastating argument (and violence) to the contrary across the globe in the last half century. It is basically the academics’ version of the flag pin that all politicians now routinely attach to their lapels.<sup>23</sup> We might agree to disagree on this point, although it would take some work to explain the seeming delusion under which an earlier generation labored. There is no disputing the mythical status of the second idea. The authoritative version can be found in the opening pages of Columbia University political scientist Michael Doyle’s *Empires* (1986), where he baldly states that “mainstream” international relations showed no scholarly interest in imperialism, a point no reviewer of the book ever challenged him on.<sup>24</sup> Like all myths, its value is not in the facts that it purports to offer but in what it tells us about experts on world affairs such as Doyle who believe it to be a valid argument about the world.

Doyle’s disciplinary ancestors knew the opposite to be true about the United States and about imperialism. By “ancestors” I don’t mean the fictive ones conjured in today’s textbooks and undergraduate lectures. By ancestors I mean (and I use this identifier intentionally) the men at Princeton, Columbia, and elsewhere who founded the first international relations departments, funding committees, memorials, journals, summer institutes, research centers, conferences, and professional associations. I include those who gained the early support of the Carnegie Corporation and the Rockefeller Foundation.



The term “ancestor” includes the textbooks and model syllabi that identified and tried to draw boundaries around the new field for the first time in the years before and after World War I and those who went on the radio and wrote in the mass circulation magazines and newspapers to disseminate its scientific findings.<sup>25</sup> By “ancestor” I mean the whole system of intellectual, professional, and institutional production that has made international relations what it is today, including how international relations is taught in those introductory courses that pass the rudiments of the discipline on to the next generation of scholars, opinion makers, and policy professionals.

### **Application of a Model of Mixed Institutional Origins**

Three well-known phenomena of the last decades of the nineteenth century converged to influence the turn by U.S. universities toward studying the problems that professors and what we now call public intellectuals called supremacy and dependence. A new round of imperial competition and expansion into Africa, Asia, and Latin America was in full swing. The new imperialism coincided with the creation of the flagship institutions of the modern social sciences in America, including departments, schools, endowed professorships, and professional associations.<sup>26</sup> Within many of those departments, evolutionary theory, social Darwinism, and racial anthropology shaped the research orientations of leading scholars and schools.<sup>27</sup>

Various sociologists, political scientists, historians, psychologists, and geographers at Wisconsin, Yale, Chicago, Clark, Johns Hopkins, Harvard, the University of Pennsylvania, and Columbia begin to carve out space for the interdisciplinary study of international relations. They did so even before some of the flagship departments and professional associations of the disciplines were founded.<sup>28</sup> It was insufficient even then, however, to stake a claim for autonomy and resources for the new specialization simply on the ground that the problems produced by increasing contact and conflict across the world’s biological borders spilled over the disciplinary ones. Rather, the pioneering specialists offered a unique approach to the better management of colonial administration and race subjection. The theory of “race development” held out the prospect of a more peaceful and prosperous white hegemony while reducing the threat of the race war that preoccupied self-identified white elites in the United States and elsewhere in the 1890s and 1920s and again in the 1950s.

In light of these facts, I propose we do for the history of international relations what others have done for the broader social, cultural, and political history of the United States (of which the academic discipline is a part).

In short, its racism needs to be brought to light and given serious attention. As a case in point and a kind of model of inquiry, we can look to Ann Douglas's 1995 award-winning cultural history of jazz-age New York, *Terrible Honesty: Mongrel Manhattan in the 1920s*. Its key argument is that we can't understand the history of American modernism without understanding the history of Harlem, its "Renaissance," and the African American movement of liberation. Modernism was, she insisted, a thoroughly entangled or, as an international relations professor might say, "complex-interdependent" movement of black and white writers, novelists, poets, musicians, playwrights, and philosophers.

What is true about modernism and Manhattan is also true about international relations in the United States in a fundamental respect. That is, we can't understand the history of the early decades of the discipline without understanding the long and globe-spanning freedom movements that are central to its intellectual, social, and institutional development. Consider another example to be explored in more detail later, in this case one linking the Harlem Renaissance directly to an important institution of the discipline-in-formation. The publishers of Howard University theorist Alain Locke's famous "Harlem: Mecca of the New Negro" (1925) headed New York's Foreign Policy Association, a more influential group in those years than the city's other private membership organization, the Council on Foreign Relations, which at the time functioned more like a club, and a sleepy one at that. To Foreign Policy Association leaders, the Harlem Renaissance was an instance of race development similar to other movements and places where "race contacts" had intensified notably in settler societies around the globe.

Harlem thus primarily served as a model in the negative sense for the future of world order as theorized by white scholars in the new modern scientific discipline. The Harlem-as-crucible-of-modernism in Douglas's account represented intersecting vectors of artists and thinkers remaking mass culture via engagement with black poets, painters, and playwrights. The opposite was true in the case of international relations theory, where self-identified white professors sought to understand, explain, and improve the world's stock of inferior beings and thus allegedly avert political and biological catastrophe. There, the vision of "interdependence" quickly gave way to the laws, as they described it, of "supremacy and dependency." For the psychologists, geographers, historians, and political scientists pioneering the scientific study of international relations, in other words, Harlem, particularly as the northern migration of African Americans took off in the early 1910s, exemplified the threat to white supremacy posed by "backward" and dependent peoples across the globe.

Harlem represented something distinctly different to the first African American theorists of international relations. As Locke himself wrote, it was the “largest Negro community in the world,” the “advance guard of the African peoples in their contact with Twentieth Century civilization,” the “home of the Negro’s “Zionism,” and, as “in India, in China, in Egypt, Ireland, Russia, Bohemia, [Jewish] Palestine, and Mexico,” the center of a people’s “resurgence” and pursuit of “self-determination.”<sup>29</sup> It had drawn tens of thousands of migrants from the rural South. It was, not least, a refuge. Locke’s Howard University colleagues would frequent the Hotel Theresa (the “Harlem Waldorf”) in order to escape the oppressive condition of Jim Crow in the nation’s capital city, Washington, D.C.

African Americans might earn PhDs at Harvard, thus demonstrating the validity of the laws of race development. At the same time, they were denied a role in the white profession and university system and were instead forced to create their own journals and associations.<sup>30</sup> In 1963, historian John Hope Franklin described the reality of the conditions under which he and his more senior colleagues still labored within the white academy. “When he is remembered at all he is all too often an afterthought. When his work is recognized it is usually pointed as the work of a Negro. . . . Such recognition is as much the product of the racist mentality as the Negro restrooms in the Montgomery airport are.”<sup>31</sup> Even this subordinate form of “recognition” was too much for some white academics. As we will see, the prominence of intellectuals such as W. E. B. Du Bois and Locke in a movement that asserted black people’s ineluctable right to equality and liberation led influential whites to denounce higher education for African Americans as a misguided experiment gone horribly wrong.

If we tried to plot a normal distribution (bell) curve of beliefs in black people’s capacities for more or less self-determination over the shorter or longer term, we’d fail. The results would skew to the right; that is, against equality. There were white scholars and public intellectuals associated with the new discipline-in-formation who advocated more or less permanent tutelage for darker and inferior people. So T. Lothrop Stoddard, one of the earliest advocates for realism in U.S. foreign relations in the 1920s, proposed the creation of a new representative institution for blacks that would determine policy in matters of exclusive concern to the permanently subordinate race, thus making the House of Representatives and Senate institutions by and for whites alone. Others, including many of the leading race development theorists, could imagine a time a century or two in the future when at least some of the backward peoples would have developed the capacity for self-government. As far as I have been able to determine, however, in the 1920s and 1930s no

white international relations scholar argued on either principled or pragmatic grounds for the restoration of black citizenship rights, the dismantling of Jim Crow in the United States, and self-governance, let alone independence, for the colonies. Chicago's Fredrick L. Schuman and other so-called fellow travelers might have taken such a position had they been pressed, but Schuman did not take such a position in his published work. The shape of the curve would approximate a normal distribution only if we added the positions of African American and Afro-Caribbean thinkers.

Princeton-trained Raymond Leslie Buell was the only professor I could find in the 1920s–1930s who actually engaged with African Americans as intellectuals.<sup>32</sup> Buell wrote the discipline's best-selling textbook *International Relations* (1925), in which he analyzed the great problems of world order emerging from the “restless energy of Caucasian people” in their “search for new markets” and “demand for cheap labor.” The primary problem was imperialism and the tensions that resulted as white men competed to extend their dominance over inferior races. Whites in settler societies from Canada to New Zealand were also all wrestling with imperialism's mirror image; that is, the tensions that arose as nonwhites sought entrance into the white man's country.

Buell quit his Harvard professorship to run the research program of the Foreign Policy Association because he said he wanted to do something meaningful to improve a world of rising tensions between the races. Yet he based his plans for reform of the southern United States on the system in place in South Africa. His mentor, constitutional scholar Edward S. Corwin, a friend of Woodrow Wilson and editor of the influential series in political science that published *International Relations*, died still waiting to see the Supreme Court's decision in *Brown v. Board* reversed and segregation brought back to schools.<sup>33</sup> Through the World War II years, and as the professors of international relations began to realign history and theory to meet the needs of the new U.S. national security state, too many of them continued to uphold the so-called color line rather than engage critically with the problem of hierarchy and modern world order in the ways that Alain Locke and other renaissance thinkers pioneered.

## The Howard School

Explicating the relationship of racism to imperialism was an abiding concern of the scholars that comprised the Howard school of international relations. They include Locke (Ph.D., Harvard 1918), the Philadelphia-born intellectual powerhouse who won a Rhodes scholarship to Oxford in 1907 (the first

and only black awardee for another fifty-six years) and a primary challenger of central tenets of race development theory.<sup>34</sup> The Nobel Prize-winning Ralph Bunche was a onetime radical Marxist thinker (PhD Harvard 1934) who joined the Howard faculty in 1928, a year after graduating from UCLA. His close comrade on the faculty, E. Franklin Frazier (PhD Chicago 1931), studied at Clark and did pioneering work on the black bourgeoisie. They clashed off and on with the pan-Africanist protégé of Du Bois, Rayford Logan (PhD Harvard 1936), who joined the history department in 1938. Bunche, Frazier, and Locke brought the Trinidad-born Eric Williams (DPhil Oxford 1938), whose work upended moralist explanations for the end of the slave trade, to Howard's political science department. He later became first prime minister of independent Trinidad and Tobago. And Logan invited Ohio-born Merze Tate (PhD Radcliffe 1941), the first black woman to receive a doctorate in international relations, to join the history department after Williams and Bunche opposed her hire (and that of a second woman) in political science.

My use of the term *Howard school* harks back the 1990s turn toward speaking about a distinct Italian school of international relations theory inspired by the work of Antonio Gramsci. That label is artificial and complicated: the Italian school scholars did not all use Gramscian ideas in the same way to the same ends, and some identified in this way rejected the label.<sup>35</sup> The same is true about the Howard school theorists and their evolving ideas about racism and imperialism; doubtless they would have rejected the label too. Nonetheless, the Howard school thinkers stand out for their early and relentless critiques of the supposed truths of racial science and the role racism played in sustaining imperialism. They also stand out for the connections they forged—unique among their generation of professors—with the theoreticians of liberation and the future leaders of independent Africa and the island nations of the Caribbean. So despite their intellectual and political differences, they represent a critical counternetwork to the networks dedicated to upgrading the institutions of colonial rule that white professors forged with the so-called Geneva institutions in the era of the League of Nations.

The silence about (that is to say, ignorance of) the Howard school scholars and their work on world politics confirms a central insight of Toni Morrison's "Black Matters." She says that after World War II the American academy took to ignoring racism instead of facing its history and ongoing effects. She calls it "a graceful, even generous liberal gesture" on the part of literary critics who remained silent about practices of exclusion and subordination that are present in the history of letters, the construction of literary canons that entirely excluded African American authors, and the criticisms deemed

worth making about the canonical texts, but the point can be generalized, as I demonstrate here.<sup>36</sup> Virtually every history of international relations to date turns out to be about *white* political scientists teaching in *white* departments and publishing in *white* journals. The race blindness is almost certainly unselfconscious. That's Morrison's point. Nor would it surprise her to learn that in the past fifty years the only serious discussions within international relations of Du Bois, Alain Locke, and the handful of other African American theorists of international relations are by the smaller handful of African Americans and Afro Caribbeans who taught international relations beginning in the early 1970s and who teach it today.<sup>37</sup> It turns out that identity matters to the most basic practices of discipline making.<sup>38</sup>

While what I have called the "norm against noticing" explains much of the variance, additional factors are at work that make it harder rather than easier to identify any of the Howard school theorists with the emerging discipline of international relations.<sup>39</sup> One is the unavailability of some critical texts. Bunche's *World View of Race* was not reissued as part of the effort to "restore his reputation," as Arnold Rampersand put it, with the airing on the Public Broadcasting Service of *Ralph Bunche: American Odyssey* (2001, dir. William Greaves).<sup>40</sup> Bunche had disowned his fifteen-year-old study of racism and imperialism in 1950, the year he won his Nobel peace prize and was named a vice president of the American Political Science Association (He served as its president in 1954.). The real revelation is Alain Locke and his controversial 1915 and 1916 Howard lectures on race development, which were not published until 1992. Similarly, the report he wrote in 1928 for the Foreign Policy Association on the League of Nations mandate system was not unearthed from the archives until 2012. Merze Tate's dissections of the failed arms control efforts of the early twentieth century and her histories of imperialist rivalries in the Pacific are also out of print, and four additional completed studies of imperialism in Australasia and Africa languish in her archive.

The more fundamental factor in accounting for the time it has taken to identify, contextualize, and wrestle with the ideas of the Howard school is that a critical mass of African American scholars did not emerge in Cold War international relations in the 1970s and 1980s. This was so despite the significant resources committed to building interdisciplinary African American Studies programs and departments at leading colleges and universities as a way to introduce "non-White subject matter in the curriculum," increase minority enrollment, and create a demand for black faculty.<sup>41</sup> The absence from international relations of all three—black faculty, students, and theory—is a striking difference from disciplines such as English,

anthropology (which has since taught us a great deal about the relationship between colonialism and racism), and history (which shares borders with international relations and where nonetheless a virtual barrier has prevented the migration of a two-decade-old scholarship on race and U.S. foreign policy making). In the intervening decades these other fields have produced truer accounts of their own development, reorganized their curricula (at least in part), recognized the force of racism, and, of course, adopted the critiques and once-heretical ideas put forward by black thinkers from outside the segregated white institutions. In the case of international relations, as we will see, a weak challenge from within was contained, preserving the discipline as a white redoubt.

It might have been different. Certainly the divide between African American studies and international relations was not nearly as wide during the first decade of demonstrations, building takeovers, and demands for black and “Third World” studies as it is now. In African American studies today, each of the Howard school thinkers has a biographer and, with the exception of Merze Tate, an important position in the revisionist pantheon of “founders” of the new field.<sup>42</sup> African American studies is now the primary if posthumous home of Du Bois (in the way that sociology often claims Karl Marx as a “founder”) and his interlocutors Locke and Frazier, who receive secondary appointments for their signal contributions to the interdisciplinary study of race. The posthumous appointments of Bunche and Logan were delayed for a while. That is because Logan, the onetime pan-Africanist went to his grave opposing black studies (and black identity), while Bunche, who had always rejected racial identification as the basis for organizing in the political arena, had come to be seen as an enemy rather than an ally of worldwide black liberation in the 1960s.

This book recovers some of the lost social scientific context and specifically international relations content of the work of Locke and his colleagues. We are fighting against the tide of the Cold War; the embrace in the African American intellectual community, as elsewhere, of the rewritten past of empire (it never happened); the “Americanist” cast of the departments and centers (to which black internationalism is a reaction), the juggernaut of academic specialization; and, not least, the distorting and flattening effects of all those African American studies lectures, syllabi, qualifying exams, and the like in the intervening decades.

### **A Minor in African American Studies**

African American and Africana Studies departments and programs in U.S. universities emerged out of the demonstrations, takeovers of administration

buildings, and so forth on American campuses in the late 1960s, when a student movement arose to demand the inclusion of “black studies” in the curriculum.<sup>43</sup> Some institutions still call the relevant administrative unit the “Department of Black Studies” and the undergraduate course of study the “major in Black Studies.” As historian Martha Biondi shows, a fundamental objective in creating black studies was to expose the racism and thus the false claims that underpinned so-called objective and detached scholarship in the disciplines. The critical tool for doing so was to bring black people into history and theory, not just as subjects but also as sources of truer accounts of the world.<sup>44</sup>

Those who founded the first programs, departments, and professional associations emphasized the inescapable interdisciplinary nature of any systematic inquiry into the “development of people of African descent,” to quote from the description of the major at Wesleyan University today. Where the exigencies of the Cold War, the needs of the new national security state, and the instrumentalism of foundation officials (from Carnegie to some extent but primarily from the Ford Foundation) drove the building of area studies centers and departments, the demand for Africana studies, in contrast, emerged “from below” and paved the way for women’s and ethnic studies.<sup>45</sup> The Ford Foundation spent millions in the 1970s and 1980s on advanced research and teaching capacity, hoping to institutionalize its preferred academic model for what it called Afro-American studies.<sup>46</sup>

According to sociologist Fabio Rojas, who surveyed faculty and universities across the United States, as of the early 2000s, African American studies had survived institutional and intellectual conflicts over legitimacy (and budget lines) to secure a “niche” at “highly prestigious universities.” Following Temple University’s lead in 1988, the number of PhD programs have increased, albeit slowly. As of 2014 there are a dozen institutions where one can earn a PhD in Africana or black or African American Studies. At the same time, only about 10 percent of four-year colleges and universities offer undergraduate or graduate degrees, and most such programs are small and are often cobbled together through joint appointments. Rojas estimates that a typical department includes seven professors, at least some of whom will have home departments in, for example, history or English. The majority of programs offer bachelor but not master or doctoral degrees.

The boundaries of belonging in African American studies are highly porous in comparison, say, to economics, leading Rojas to call it “a permanent interdiscipline.”<sup>47</sup> Nonetheless, in the case of international relations we have a good example of another discipline that until the 1960s or so continued to emphasize (or express anxiety about) both its necessarily “interdisciplinary” character and porous borders with history, political science, area studies,



economics, geography, and so forth. Unlike African American studies, no one in the United States thinks of international relations as a permanent interdisciplinary. Rather, at most universities international relations now exists formally as a group of specialists (a “subfield” in the profession’s argot) within political science departments.

In the course of transmutation from a radical social movement in the 1960s–1970s to academic specialization in the 1980s–1990s, the *American* in African American studies increasingly drove teaching and research in the field. On the one hand, Biondi emphasizes the internationalist (or better) anti-imperialist commitments of the “student generation” and their solidarity with African or Third World liberation movements. On the other hand, Rojas’s early 2000s survey reports the relatively low ranking accorded Padmore’s *Pan-Africanism or Communism* (1955, reissued in 1972) in a list of would-be canonical texts headed by Du Bois’s *Souls of Black Folk*, Toni Morrison’s *Beloved*, and Lorraine Hansberry’s *A Raisin in the Sun*.<sup>48</sup> Biondi also documents how early leaders of the black studies movement faced serious pushback from foundation officials, university administrations, and hostile white faculty as they tried to combine “the study of continental Africa, the Caribbean, and the United States.”<sup>49</sup>

The strongest evidence of the Americanist tilt in the prestige departments—that is, away from the orientation in solidarity with colonial peoples and from the theorizing of the racism/imperialism nexus—is the recent campaign to “internationalize” the study of Aframerica through a renewed emphasis on hemispheric and trans-Atlantic movements of peoples and ideas.<sup>50</sup> This is an instance of a more widespread challenge to “the naturalization” of the American nation-state, or “methodological nationalism,” one that is still under way across the more humanistic zones of the human sciences.<sup>51</sup> In 1998, anthropologist Jane Guyer, then at Northwestern University, unearthed the correspondence between her distinguished predecessor and the founder of Northwestern’s African studies program, Melville Herskovits, and the Carnegie and Ford Foundations. He had tried to raise funds for a combined, Atlantic Ocean–spanning program in “Negro and African Studies.”<sup>52</sup>

## Back to the Future

Herskovits’s design is a road not taken for Cold War–era Africa “area” studies, African American area studies from below, and, for that matter, for the one area never included on the Social Science Research Council’s war-time maps of future “world areas” research, namely, the United States. It is,

nonetheless, the model that was used in the 1920s when American race development theorists and their partners in Australia, Canada, China, Hawaii, Korea, Japan, and New Zealand launched the most important research organization in international relations of the interwar years, the Institute of Pacific Relations. Howard's Ralph Bunche attended the institute's Mont-Tremblant conference in 1942 while he was on leave from the university and was working for the Office of Strategic Services. Later he would claim that at the 1942 meeting, the deliberations—which by then had expanded to include Indian nationalists, among others—helped to lay the foundation for the future UN trusteeship system negotiated in San Francisco in 1945.<sup>53</sup>

Tufts political scientist Pearl Robinson, the president of the Association of African Studies in 2007, has done yeoman's work in commemorating Bunche's contribution as pioneering "Africanist," a field that she traces back to the 1880s.<sup>54</sup> Bunche did fieldwork in Togo and Dahomey, but he also did fieldwork in what we now know as Indonesia. Had Secretary of State Cordell Hull not overridden the color line in the State Department to appoint him associate chief of the Division of Dependent Area Affairs (under Alger Hiss), Bunche might be remembered now as a pioneering Asianist, since he had already secured funding to head a two-year study for the Institute of Pacific Relations on the future of the Indonesian independence movement.

What Bunche *was*—and, surely, self- and collective professional identifications then in play trump the ones waiting to be invented—was a specialist in comparative colonial administration, a field in which an ambitious Harvard government department offered the PhD in the 1920s. The field exam, which Raymond Leslie Buell and his colleagues devised, is as good an artifact as any—many more will be found in the pages to follow—of the lost world of the then-new science of international relations in the United States. Du Bois and Locke were engaged with its problems from the start, as second-class citizens to be sure, and things would get worse in the segregated departments and associations before they eventually got better.

Harvard historian William E. Langer (PhD Clark 1923) headed the Research and Analysis Branch of the Office of Strategic Services during World War II. Bunche had joined Langer's team as the British Empire Section's Africa expert, which is what led to his attending the Institute on Pacific Relations' Mont-Tremblant meeting. Langer launched his career as one of the young professors associated with the George Hubbard Blakeslee group at Clark, the founders of the new *Journal of Race Development*, another of those artifacts that we can use to recreate the lost world of the innovators at Harvard, Columbia, and elsewhere who were seeking solutions to the

policy dilemmas that “modern” imperialism had produced. The most pressing policy problems arose, the first professors of international relations said, from the extension of the American colonial model in New Mexico and other territories to the new Caribbean and Pacific dependencies. They took great care to emphasize what was “new” about the causes, nature, and consequences of contemporary imperialism, thereby distinguishing the object and defining the boundaries of a new interdisciplinary space separate from the “traditional” concerns of the international lawyers or the antiquarian scholars of ancient Greece and Rome.

Langer also played a role as his teachers and friends oversaw the transition of the *Journal of Race Development/International Relations* to its new owners, the Council on Foreign Relations. He served as editorial assistant to the new editor of *Foreign Affairs*, Archibald Cary Coolidge, who was Blakeslee’s teacher and another of the leading figures in the new discipline, and he also later took over the book review section from Clark’s Harry Elmer Barnes. What made Langer’s reputation and led to his appointment as the inaugural Coolidge Professor of History in 1936, however, was the publication the year before of the highly praised two-volume *Diplomacy of Imperialism*. Although it is virtually impossible to name a leading international relations scholar in the 1920s and 1930s who did not write on the topic of empire, Langer’s study stood out for its critical reconsideration of the 30-year-old work by British economist John Hobson, *Imperialism* (1902). Langer repackaged the critique of Hobson as a stand-alone article in *Foreign Affairs*. Thirty years later, Merze Tate’s editor had her cut a long first chapter on theories of imperialism from her newest book. Readers wouldn’t be interested, he told her. Tate’s dissertation supervisor meanwhile had confidentially advised the Rockefeller Foundation against even funding her study. As “far as her field of International Relations is concerned” the history of imperial rivalries in the Pacific was of little significance, he wrote.<sup>55</sup> The book never appeared. That act was a clear harbinger of the world we live in now.

Today a vast gulf divides international relations from Africana studies. It is wider certainly than the walk across Harvard Yard that gets you from the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs to the Hutchins Center for African and African American Research or to and from the high-rises, glass boxes, repurposed American Craftsmen bungalows, Gothic towers, and landmark Minoru Yamasaki buildings that house the two departments on other campuses. We could measure that distance in multiple ways, I suspect. There is little if any overlap in the students in the introductory courses, few if any double majors in an era when double majors are the norm, and the professors in the two disciplines have taken disparate paths to

their respective PhDs—English or history or sociology first degrees in the case of Africana studies and political science in the overwhelming majority of cases in international relations. Citation counts would make the division clear as well. Or we can consider a simple anecdote. Du Bois, a giant of American arts, letters, and the social sciences, served on the editorial board of the *Journal of Race Development* and continued to publish on Africa in the successor publications. None of today's premier public intellectuals and leaders in the discipline Du Bois is said to have inspired—Michael Eric Dyson, Henry Louis Gates Jr., Cornel West—writes for *Foreign Affairs*.<sup>56</sup> It is not a criticism. It is an observation that helps explain the large gaps in the posthumously revised curricula vitae of the members of the Howard school.

Meanwhile, in quadrants where *Foreign Affairs* is sometimes mistaken for a peer-reviewed journal, practitioners of international relations unselfconsciously reproduce the views of those in the humanities a generation ago.<sup>57</sup> Political scientists typically understand the tradition of international relations scholarship to be race blind. States, not races, have always been the discipline's basic unit of analysis. The “security dilemma” leaders confront is the timeless problem that constitutes international relations as a discipline, based on ideas the practitioners now routinely trace back to the ancient wisdom of Thucydides and Machiavelli, unaware that the genealogy is an invention of the Cold War years. The specialists contend, further, that if people of color are not read or taught it is because they have not written books and articles that shaped the field or that matter to others working in it now. It cannot be because the hierarchical structures Americans have built, including the discipline itself, using the biologically false idea of race, are to blame.

My study of the Howard school thinkers and their entanglements with the white social scientific world shows how and why these political scientists have gotten it wrong. Consider William Langer's autobiography, *In and Out of the Ivory Tower*, which appeared in 1977, on the eve of his death and in the same year Merze Tate, one of the first political scientists to work on arms control retired from Howard. Reviewing the start of his long career in Worcester and Cambridge and his role in launching *Foreign Affairs*, Langer thought it important to explain how in those days “international relations meant race relations.”<sup>58</sup> Back then the Howard school theorists were the main source of dissent in a rigidly segregated profession regarding the pseudoscientific foundations of the new discipline and the most important center for theorizing the feasible alternatives to continued dependency and domination in the decades before 1960.

## Where We Go From Here

I have organized the book chronologically, in four parts, divided into nine chapters. It is a history of the men, overwhelmingly, who argued about race and empire in the course of building institutions inside and outside the white academy in order to advance the new science of international relations. The ideas are known (by some), but not in this context. The institutions themselves are mostly unknown, although they matter a lot, since there is really no other way to define the discipline given, at least through the 1950s, an inability otherwise to distinguish what they did from other social scientists, as those same men routinely admitted. It is also a crowded cast of relatively unknown teachers, researchers, and academic entrepreneurs, so to make the narrative easier to follow, each of the four parts focuses primarily on a distinct pair of scholars: W. E. B. Du Bois and John William Burgess (1898 to World War I), Alain Locke and Raymond Leslie Buell (the interwar era), Ralph Bunche and Edward Mead Earle (World War II), and Rayford Logan and Harold Isaacs (the 1950s). The last chapter is the exception, appropriately, in that it turns to recount the career of Merze Tate.

Part I begins with the responses of the social sciences to America's conquest of Cuba, Guam, Hawaii, and the Philippines in 1898.<sup>59</sup> Imperialism's new era had led to profound divisions across the disciplines, as reflected in the organization of the American Political Science Association in 1903. Chapter 1 discusses the progressives who led the association and their efforts to advance the theory and practice of colonial administration. The imperial turn had multiplied the country's race problems, which, many argued, posed new threats to the continued hegemony or even survival of whites, precisely as the anti-imperialists had warned. John W. Burgess, the giant of late nineteenth-century political science, was one of the most outspoken critics. As a consequence he ended his career as an outcast from rather than leader of the new APSA.<sup>60</sup>

Chapter 2 turns from institutions to ideas. In the new science of international relations, the biological division of the world mattered much more for theory building than a territorial division, but the territorial division that mattered most was that between the so-called tropic and temperate zones of the world economy. These boundaries dictated the path of race development: they had done so in the past through colonization by Anglo-Saxons and would do so in the future through control over and enhancement of the labor power of the semi-civilized races using techniques of uplift. International lawyers might have regarded the boundaries between (the small set of) states (to which the law of nations applied) as essential to their art, but

political scientists defined themselves above all by their difference from lawyers, and in building a science of imperial administration they turned to Herbert Spencer, August Comte, William Graham Sumner, Benjamin Kidd, and John Wesley Powell, not Hugo Grotius. At the same time, Du Bois and his heirs in the Howard school would begin to insist that history, not biology, explained hierarchy, specifically the history of colonial and mercantile capitalist expansion and of the transatlantic slave trade that secured Western people's dominance and African, Asian, and Caribbean people's subordination.

Part II situates the beginning of the Howard school relative to the other main developments in the social science of international relations in the 1920s, a decade marked by an increased focus on imperialism, white supremacy, and the prospects of race war. Chapter 3 discusses the rising anxieties across the so-called Anglosphere as movements of "colored peoples" began to demand the end of their subjugation. Alain Locke was a leading philosopher of the freedom movements and an indefatigable promoter of the Howard school. Chapter 4 focuses on institution building, including the Institute of Pacific Relations and the Williamstown Institute of Politics, the Social Science Research Council's first Committee on International Relations in 1926, and New York's Foreign Policy Association, a progressive counterpart to the Council on Foreign Relations with a well-funded research program headed by former Harvard professor Raymond Leslie Buell. Howard's international relations theorists would depend on Buell's brokerage for their entry to white society, but what defined their opportunities in contrast to denizens of virtually all other centers of international relations theorizing was Alain Locke's tireless publishing and networking and, through him, wholly unique connections to national liberation movement theorists and future leaders of independent African and Caribbean states.

Part III extends the account through the years of depression and war, and thus through the shroud of myths that Cold War-era scholars spun about "idealism" and "isolationism" (and, as one of the converts, William T. R. Fox, would add, "devil theories of international relations" that cast "munitions-makers, imperialists, and capitalists" as evildoers).<sup>61</sup> Chapter 5 focuses on the rival Marxisms of Du Bois and his most caustic critic, Ralph Bunche. Chapter 6 details the efforts by the discipline's would-be grand strategists to quarantine the Howard school theorists and their dangerous ideas about the future of black rights at home and in the colonies.

Part IV traces the impact of what MIT's Harold Isaacs (and, later, Malcolm X) called "the breakdown of the worldwide system of white supremacy" on a discipline in the process of its own dramatic reconfiguration. International relations became the site of study of the relationships among

the “white states” or, as the “biological myth,” in Hans Kohn’s words, gave way to the “spatial myth,” the “great powers.” As we will see, among some of the more politically reactionary grand strategists the biological myth still held sway. Younger and more liberal professors in contrast, would insist, just as Raymond Leslie Buell did in 1925, using his exact words in fact, that the new era of complex interdependence was different from some imagined older and obsolete one.

Those who took up the discipline’s actual old object of study (what Reinhold Niebuhr, the new prophet of realism, called “the colored continents”) did so, it came to be imagined, “for the first time” under an entirely new interdisciplinary specialization called variously “area studies,” “development,” or “modernization” theory.<sup>62</sup> In other words, hierarchy was now encoded in the architecture of the postwar research university. Accordingly, Chapter 7 shows that the bulk of foundation funds flowed to the proliferating area studies centers and research projects in the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s. One of the unwritten agenda items in the late turn to building African studies and a national African Studies Association—which happened late, since few in the United States imagined the possibility of Africans governing themselves—was keeping governance of the field in the hands of white social scientists and foundation administrators.

Chapter 8 turns to the writing and reception of *The New World of Negro Americans*, the results of a research project at MIT’s newly established Center for International Studies that contrasted sharply with the bulk of MIT’s contract research, economic development planning for various new states of Asia, and what came to be known as modernization theory. Harold Isaacs used his friend Logan at Howard, among others, to set up dozens of interviews with black writers, researchers, doctors, and lawyers in order to assess the impact of African decolonization on African American identity and the direction of the civil rights struggle.

Howard’s political scientists carved out a unique niche for themselves in a still deeply segregated and unequal discipline in part through Buell’s patronage, Locke’s entrepreneurship, and Bunche’s ambition and in part because the white departments and programs were still operating with modest outside funding at best, most of which dried up in the depression years of the 1930s. The tremendous expansion of foundation support for international and area studies centers after the war did not reach the schools and scholars that had pioneered the study of colonialism and liberation movements in Africa. Thus, chapter 9 traces the effects of the Cold War, McCarthyism, and the decision in *Brown v. Board of Education* on a cluster of innovative thinkers in international relations who for a brief period rivaled those at any white institution in the segregated academy.

A brief conclusion reviews the findings and dismisses as a diversion the question that graduate students and professors in international relations, rubbed raw by what they read, will typically fall back on, “How does this matter for theory?” The answer already exists for anyone who really cares. The question they ought to ask instead is this: How does it matter in those domains where what professors do actually makes a difference: the classroom, the department, the campus, and the professional association?

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## Conclusion

### The High Plane of Dignity and Discipline

The theorists may not have been very good but they were certainly no worse than anyone else.

—Carl Kaysen quoted in Kuklick, *Blind Oracles*.

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The amnesia about a discipline's (and thus a society's) long entanglement with race and empire extends beyond the work of the Howard school theorists, obviously. To dismiss the scholarship of whites as a catalog of errors and wrong turns on the way to our illustrious present is to succumb to one more illusion. As Charles Lindblom, a former president of the American Political Science Association, concluded, while some political scientists believe themselves to be engaged in “scientific inquiry” the enterprise is better understood as an “endless debate.”<sup>1</sup>

#### **A Better Tomorrow, Tomorrow**

Consider the case of Leonard Woolf, the influential member of the Bloomsbury group, founder of the Hogarth Press, and husband of Virginia. He also mattered to the course of international relations theory in the 1920s through his works on war, international government, the mandates, and imperialism. Writing in the *Journal of International Relations* in 1921, Harry Elmer Barnes judged Woolf's *Empire and Commerce in Africa: A Study of Economic Imperialism* (1920) as “a contribution to the literature of cardinal importance.”<sup>2</sup> Woolf's sharp questioning of the mercantilist underpinnings of imperialism and of the high-minded, self-denying principles in which such policies came wrapped has lost none of its force. “The State, enthroned in its impersonality

and a glamour of patriotism, can always make a wilderness and call it peace, or make a conquest and call it civilization.”

Another of his important contributions has gone unrecognized until now. Decades before the post–World War II realists began to identify the ancient Greek historian Thucydides as one of their own, Woolf introduced a discussion of the Melian dialogue in Thucydides’s *History of the Peloponnesian War* (“the strong do what they can”) for the first time in an international relations journal in order to lay bare the struts and bolts of hierarchy. That is, the Athenians described a world divided in two. In one, principles, rights, and ethics applied. In the other, people were ruled through coercion. The full quotation matters:

For ourselves, we shall not trouble you with specious pretenses—either of how we have a right to our empire because we overthrew the Medes, or are now attacking you because of wrong that you have done us—and make a long speech which would not be believed; and in return we hope that you, instead of thinking to influence us by saying that you did not join the Spartans, although their colonists, or that you have done us no wrong, will aim at what is feasible, holding in view the real sentiments of us both; since you know as well as we do that right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.<sup>3</sup>

In *Empire and Commerce*, Woolf advanced the idea that trusteeship was a means by which the right and law that governed one-quarter of the world might be extended in the face of the weakness of subject races and the relentless press of investors competing to control raw materials, utilities, and so forth in the colonies and dependencies. The “European state,” he hoped, would be “changed from an instrument of economic exploitation into an instrument of good government and progress, not for a few hundred white men but for the millions of Africans.”<sup>4</sup>

The rhetorical power of that dream of a “better tomorrow, tomorrow” (in Stephen Colbert’s words) has lost none of its force a century later. Barack Obama insisted on as much to those assembled for the first U.S.–Africa Leaders Summit in the summer of 2014:

As President, I’ve made it clear that the United States is determined to be a partner in Africa’s success—a good partner, an equal partner, and a partner for the long term. We don’t look to Africa simply for its natural resources; we recognize Africa for its greatest resource, which is its people and its talents and their potential. We don’t simply want to extract minerals from the ground for our growth; we want to build

genuine partnerships that create jobs and opportunity for all our peoples and that unleash the next era of African growth. That's the kind of partnership America offers.<sup>5</sup>

While Woolf had high hopes 100 years ago for the new League of Nations' mandate system, historian Rayford Logan posed some sharp questions, as we saw. The vaunted new thinking about "sacred trusts" at Versailles in 1919 and all such institutions intended to redress the wrongs of colonialism reflected the same principles that were advanced while European powers were carving up Africa at the Berlin Conference in 1884–1885.<sup>6</sup> Evictions, forced labor, peonage, and political disfranchisement continued in the African (and Pacific) mandates, as Logan, Buell, and others showed, with only slight differences (if any) from what was happening in other colonies.<sup>7</sup> In 1929, a British Labour government passed a Colonial Development Act, with much fanfare, to end the exploitation and neglect of so-called colored races after a first postwar decade fixated on the increased exploitation of raw materials. Unfortunately, the 1929 act served primarily to encourage increased British exports and reduce unemployment at home.<sup>8</sup> "Reform" turned out to mean "more of the same."

Widespread labor unrest in the Caribbean on the eve of World War II led to the addition of "Welfare" to the title of the old act and the creation of a joint Anglo-American Caribbean Commission for which Howard's Eric Williams served as consultant and, later, director of research. With each emendation and extension beyond Trinidad in 1945, 1950, and after, there was, as we saw, an intellectual *middlewoman*, in this case, Margery Perham, who was ready to work up an article for *Foreign Affairs* that acknowledged past failures. Despite such missteps, the postwar Labour Party government would guide the empire's "partners" safely on their long, steep climb toward self-government and away from the cliff edge the "doctrinaire emancipator" would lead the colonized to.<sup>9</sup>

Logan's solution to the problem of the ever receding horizon of self-determination entailed mobilizing the NAACP and kindred organizations behind the transfer of authority over all existing colonies and dependencies to a new, upgraded mandate administration. He also insisted that commission members include actual subject peoples. Instead, the UN Trusteeship Council created at San Francisco in 1945, where Ralph Bunche relaunched his career, would "supervise" only eleven B class and C class mandates-turned-trusts out of the eighty or so colonies and dependencies around the world. The members of the council were the administering powers—the UK, France, Belgium, New Zealand, Australia, and the United States (the occupying power in Micronesia and a few other Pacific islands)—and an equal number of

nonadministering UN members. Logan concluded that the darker races had been betrayed once more.

Did the new trusteeship administration make a difference? We can't say with any certainty. The reality is that Somaliland, Togoland, Tanganyika, Ruanda-Urundi, Samoa, and other trusts opted for "premature" independence around 1960 in lock step with national liberation movements and other agents of what Harold Isaacs called "the great continental rearrangement" and the "end of white supremacy in the world."<sup>10</sup> To my knowledge, no one has since gone back to compare the administration of trust and nontrust territories in the decade or so before the passage of UN's Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in December 1960.

The precise date matters because with the rush to decolonize thereafter and the passage of time, not to mention the kinds of prejudices we have been exploring throughout this book, it is conventional now to imagine the Trusteeship Council's mission as that of guiding the "transition to independence." Yet as we have seen, the council's founding officials considered such a future extremely unlikely.<sup>11</sup> The debate, to the extent that there was one, was still between those who explained the unfolding catastrophe as a result of the limited capacities of black peoples and those who emphasized empire's *raison d'être*: maximum exploitation at minimal cost.

If anything, Bunche, who headed the UN's Trusteeship Division that was the precursor to the UN Trusteeship Council, grew more, not less, pessimistic about the prospects for independence for much of Africa. The trustee powers themselves, with the exception of New Zealand, all abstained from the 1960 declaration with South Africa, which had refused to transfer its own mandate over what is now Namibia. Fifty years later, a handful of scholars began to agitate for the resurrection of the only recently mothballed UN trusteeship apparatus. Palau gained its independence in 1994 although the U.S. Department of Interior still oversees federal programs there. For some, refitting the trusteeship system is the answer to the problem of "rogue states" and "state failures" in Cambodia, East Timor, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, and elsewhere. For others, it is a humane alternative to the destruction the United States wrought in Iraq in 2003. All these advocates of "neotrusteeship," though, conjure a past that never actually existed.<sup>12</sup>

The subsequent waves of Cold War and post-Cold War history writing, theory building, and identity crafting have contributed to making that imagined past seem plausible to otherwise smart people today. We saw Ed Earle, the Institute of Advanced Studies' resident "re-imaginer," make the case for Wilson as a true balance-of-power realist, although his revisionism never gained

traction. Instead, today, Wilson is cast as the dreamer of self-determination and inspirer of independence movements in Africa and Asia.<sup>13</sup> These “liberal internationalist” fables assume that the meaning of the concept of self-determination between then and now is fixed. They exaggerate its place at the Paris Peace Conference. They ignore the fundamentals of the political science of the day that were advanced by Wilson himself, Princeton’s most famous political scientist, concerning the differing capacity of races to comprehend or move toward “self-government.” Today’s liberal internationalists plug in a ready-made story instead of seriously interrogating indigenous ideas of freedom circulating in Cairo, Delhi, Shanghai, and Mecca. That tale always assumes faith in the transparent and honest sentiments of one or another U.S. visionary (Wilson in 1919, Roosevelt in 1942 with the Atlantic Charter, Truman in 1948 during the run-up to the partitioning of Palestine, Eisenhower in 1956 after the Suez Crisis, Kennedy in 1961 with his “embrace” of “non-alignment,” and so on). The tale inevitably ends with disenchantment. That story reflects deeply held prejudices in western international relations theory about what John Hobson calls the “derivative” or defective agency of so-called nonwhite or nonwestern peoples.<sup>14</sup>

When U.S. identity was “recoded” in international relations theory during World War II, the discipline turned its back on the analyses of the “new imperialism” of the 1920s. The turn was akin to the hastened recoding of Germany during World War I from exemplary “Teutonic constitutional” democracy to corrupt autocracy at home and from reformist liberal imperial power to brutish exploiters abroad, in Africa. Scholarship on imperialism in the interwar years propelled the careers of young white international relations scholars, including Harry Barnes, Leslie Buell, Ed Earle, Leland Jenks, Parker Moon, and Quincy Wright.<sup>15</sup> By the 1940s, the study of American imperialism had been abandoned and the Cold War’s leading international relations theorist, Hans Morgenthau, limited his discussion of the Caribbean in *Politics among Nations* (1948) to a paragraph or two on the U.S. acquisition of the Virgin Islands from Denmark in 1917.<sup>16</sup>

The record since that time affords many opportunities to gauge the seeming impossibility of reconciling the theory with the practice of the civilizing mission or of its cognate, race development that J. A. Hobson, the advocate for enlightened imperialism, first identified in 1902. I have discussed two such cases. (In any such effort, it’s important to keep in mind that after 1950 or so, the modifier “race” was dropped in favor of “economic” or “political” development and that “development” has since given way to “modern nation-building.”<sup>17</sup>) The first case is that of Harold Isaacs, who compared the lofty ideals of the Truman administration and Point IV aid with the brutal

record of U.S. imperialism in Asia. This was the last time Isaacs deployed the imperialism concept. After that, he began a political twelve-step program at the Hoover Institution and from there, he joined MIT's Center for International Studies. The incoming Kennedy administration tacitly acknowledged the reactionary nature of U.S. foreign policy in the 1950s. The new president called for recalibrating relationships, recognizing nationalism and not confusing it with communism, and embracing guided independence in Africa.

The second case is the brutal escalation of the war in Vietnam that key Center for International Studies mandarins and Harvard Kennedy School builders championed. As Bruce Kuklick shows in *Blind Oracles*, even those who began to rethink their support for the war kept their doubts to themselves, particularly with the growth of the New Left on campuses across the country. Kuklick details how Ernest May and others identified the radical revisionist historians and sociologists of the Cold War and their studies of economic imperialism as a threat to the "professional authority" of mainstream international relations scholars and argued that the danger needed to be contained.<sup>18</sup> Leaders of the stillborn insurgency in political science have a hard time recalling a single young international relations scholar in the forefront of their movement that backed the failed bid of the 66-year-old Hans Morgenthau for the presidency of the American Political Science Association in 1970. International relations scholars are conspicuous by their absence, too, from the compendia and other artifacts of the era, such as *The End of Political Science* (1970), the San Francisco Marxist collectivist journal *Kapitalstate*, and so on.

The decades since the early 1970s are littered with the promises by one U.S. administration (and its scholarly auxiliaries) after another that American policy would empower democrats and indigenous entrepreneurs instead of the dictators, oligarchs, and crony capitalist allies of the preceding administration.<sup>19</sup> In the region I know best, the Middle East, the George W. Bush administration spoke of the failures of his forerunners to advance the democratic nation building that was finally under way in Iraq under U.S. tutelage after 2003.<sup>20</sup> Nonetheless, in Cairo in May 2011, President Obama ostensibly opened a "new chapter" in U.S. diplomacy in support of "self-determination" after "decades of accepting the world as it is in the region."<sup>21</sup> You get the picture.

## Across the White Meridian

It is hard for readers today to accept the idea that race or the color line is where academic ancestors located the "international" in international relations.

It shouldn't be. After all, the first U.S. Christian missionary association, the American Board of Commissioners of *Foreign Missions*, sent its agents to India, Hawaii, China, and Tennessee, among the Cherokee in the 1820s and 1830s. However, missionaries couldn't settle in the Black Belt; it was illegal for slaves to read and write.<sup>22</sup> Nonetheless, as we saw, Aframerica was in essence just one more "case" for assessing the laws of race development and their limits in an era when white supremacy began to encounter sustained challenges to its preferred world order in the 1920s. Thus I suggested some grounds for rethinking the genealogy of the idea of the "internal colony," a mainstay of 1960s and 1970s theory that critics of black separatist thought blamed on a misguided despair and problematic readings of Lenin.<sup>23</sup>

Ralph Bunche opposed Garvyism and its "back to Africa" call. He also rejected the so-called Black Belt thesis, including the chimera of pursuing independence in some southern territory (where white international relations theorists and statesmen nonetheless proposed to apply lessons learned in the study of colonial rule in Africa). Let's not confuse the Bunche of the "American Creed" and recipient of a Boy Scouts of America Silver Buffalo Award (1951) with the agitator and small "c" communist who joined the Howard faculty in 1929. For him and the other Howard radicals, worldwide black liberation would come only through a working-class alliance and anti-capitalist revolution. They got that one wrong. We should also acknowledge that Marcus Garvey, leader of the trans-Atlantic black mass movement that seemingly confirmed political scientists in their beliefs about races and world politics, got at least one argument right about what we might now call the "international decolonization regime" in U.S. domestic politics. African Americans would not be free unless and until Africans were free. Garvey first made this argument in the 1920s.<sup>24</sup> In the 1950s and 1960s it became a mainstay of policy analysis, by Isaacs most notably, and, two decades later, it was rediscovered by students of "Cold War civil rights."

One of Bunche's arguments in *A World View of Race* stands the test of time. He argued that racism served as a remarkably productive device for the imperialist. I have traced the idea back to Locke and Du Bois, identifying it as a central tenet of Howard school theory when most white international relations theorists clung to the seeming truths of the science of dominance and subjugation. At the same time, I was unable to find any white international relations scholar other than Fred Schuman who confronted this uncomfortable truth head on in his writings in the 1930s. The story is different after World War II, when the "biological myth" that races are real came under attack and, as we saw, scientific racists in the discipline took to conspiracy theories to explain the seeming eclipse of reason among liberals.

I also traced the lingering effects of the previous decades of theorizing about race and international relations in the renewed predictions of race war in the 1960s by politicians and pundits. We can also turn to memoirs, diaries, and biographies of the policymakers and grand strategists with which international relations theory is centrally concerned, to gauge the persistence of the belief in the biological basis of hierarchy through the last half of the twentieth century.<sup>25</sup> As President Richard Nixon reportedly told his chief of staff, the inferiority of the black race was real, and he and staff needed to keep abreast of the research that linked race and intelligence. But he felt that he would also have to “do everything possible to deny” these truths publicly lest he stir up “latent prejudice.”<sup>26</sup> Meanwhile, those who would trace the rationally deliberative character of the retreat of racism from international relations scholarship (or who believe in the “internal discursive” approach to the history of international relations theory) have their work cut out for them. The debate never happened.

The debate about the applicability of models of empire to the United States after World War II never happened either. What awaits sustained study is the conversion of a Cold War discipline to ideological anticommunism and to the vision of the U.S. state as a “liberal leviathan.” Racism and imperialism were among the chief sins committed by both the vanquished German and still-to-be-defeated Soviet totalitarian rivals (although conditions in the American South were a problem for the theory). The few holdouts such as Schuman were denounced and embargoed, suffering a repetition of John Burgess’s fate in 1898, when the discipline first took up the cause of U.S. imperialism.

### **The Resource Curse**

The University of Sheffield’s John M. Hobson, the great-grandson of one of those progressive imperialists of the 1890s, has done crucial work in demonstrating not just ruptures but, more crucially, continuities in arguments in defense of hierarchy that were in play in the 1920s and remain in play today. One argument that Hobson doesn’t spend much time on is the right to secure the resources western civilization needs. We saw Robert Strausz-Hupé and Stefan Possony call for the United States to restore the colonial order in Africa and Asia to ensure western control over “strategic” raw materials. This is precisely the kind of “crackpot realism” that sociologist C. Wright Mills said in 1958 was the stock in trade of the new national security scholars.

The 1973 oil crisis spurred the creation of an entirely new field of alleged expertise in “energy and security,” represented by such stalwarts as Daniel



Yergin, a Cambridge University PhD and the founder of Cambridge (Massachusetts) Energy Research Associates; Melvin Conant, who went from studying race in the 1950s to working for Exxon and then teaching at the National War College; and Stephen Krasner, a Stanford professor and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution. The Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia keeps alive the memory of Possony's chief patron, Robert Strausz-Hupé, who did more than anyone else to make geopolitics a respectable part of the Cold War intellectual arsenal. Self-taught "geostrategist" Robert Kaplan serves as one of its advisory board members now. As Hobson shows, the arguments in Kaplan's *The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post Cold War* (2000) and *The Revenge of Geography: What the Map Tells Us about Coming Conflicts and the Battle against Fate* (2012) are unselfconscious updates of the ideas of the *Journal of Race Development's* Ellsworth Huntington and others. Arguments about hierarchy and fears about resource scarcity remain difficult if not impossible to pry apart.

In the wake of the September 11, 2001, attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon, Kaplan held up Samuel Philips Huntington as a visionary of the world "as it really looks."<sup>27</sup> Critiques of Huntington's prophecy in his *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (1996) are legion. It is sufficient to note three points. Each generation of believers in the truth of the immutability of races (then) or civilizations (now) appear to think it is enough to repeat the mantra that racists such as Jan Smuts and T. Lothrop Stoddard taught their disciples in the 1920s. The mantras say that we aren't talking "superiority and inferiority"; we are only talking "difference." Here Huntington, who launched his career with the support of the Social Science Research Council's successor committee, closely resembles both Stefan Possony and T. Lothrop Stoddard and is as unconvincing as they were. We saw Alain Locke take on these fictive ideas about races, cultures, and civilizations back in the 1920s, although no one appears to remember that now. Huntington would have appeared quite familiar to Locke in another respect: Locke dedicated much of his work to debunking the taken-for-granted idea that Africa had no real civilization. After divining the identity of the world's seven civilizations (western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic, and Latin American), Huntington famously hedged his bets by positing an eighth, "possibly African" one.<sup>28</sup>

### **Beyond Ikenberry and toward the End of Hierarchy**

Although he anticipated Gunnar Myrdal's interpretation of the American creed by a decade or two, Locke would have a harder time with its recent,

wholly unconvincing extension to the U.S.-dominated world order. Princeton's G. John Ikenberry argues that the particular liberal characteristics of American hegemony best explain its durability. He describes the American Century as a restrained and penetrated order, in the senses that other states (Great Britain, France) have an unusual degree of voice in American domestic politics and that over time institutions (NATO, GATT) came to lock in the partners. He contrasts this liberal settlement—that is, the creation of a new order after World War II—with the containment order (or settlement) vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.

What is remarkable in this account of world politics is the complete disappearance of what were once known as the inferior races. Thinkers such as Mahan, Bryce, and Adams, whom Ikenberry describes as the original intellectual sources of American liberal hegemony, were, as we saw, among the country's great racial supremacists, and his account rehabilitates—doubtless unselfconsciously—an ex-Herrenvolk U.S. democracy's ruling ideas. It is probably unselfconscious too about its embrace of international inequality, the missing third “postcolonial” settlement. One has to read these works carefully to realize that the rules of liberal hegemony apply to industrialized states only. True, Ikenberry writes,

the United States has pursued imperial policies, especially toward weak countries in the periphery. *But U.S. relations with Europe, Japan, China, and Russia cannot be described as imperial, even when “neo” or “liberal” modifies the term.* The advanced democracies operate within a “security community” in which the use or threat of force is unthinkable. Their economies are deeply interwoven. Together, they form a political order built on bargains, diffuse reciprocity, and an array of intergovernmental institutions and ad hoc working relationships.<sup>29</sup>

What is a paradox for Ikenberry, as it was for Louis Hartz before him when he surveyed the American liberal tradition to the “water's edge,” is better understood as a constitutive feature of the contemporary world order. The fact of hierarchy doesn't trouble a current generation that, like the ones before, sees it as natural or is unable or unwilling to see it at all. The more one emphasizes the essentially consensual dimensions of U.S. hegemony, the easier it is to see some of the basic and contrasting institutions and norms that apply outside what Karl Deutsch called the North Atlantic security community, which was bound, nonetheless, according to Stanley Hoffman, by its white racial identity. Decades later, others began to describe the league of alleged freedom-loving, English-speaking peoples without irony as the Anglosphere.<sup>30</sup>

As we have seen, the archives reveal what amounts to a lost world of international relations scholarship buried under the “schools of strategy” built in the 1950s and 1960s. That history bears scant resemblance to the stories told in field seminars in seminar rooms every semester, where professional identities are continuously remade. These myths have a strong hold over the U.S. profession, and the U.S. profession was and arguably still is hegemonic across the “Anglosphere.”<sup>31</sup>

Drawing on the typology of intellectual fields produced in the 1980s by organizational sociologist Richard Whitley, Ido Oren says that for decades international relations typified a “polycentric oligarchy” in which leaders of the two competing schools, realist and liberal, exerted market power over scarce reputation-making resources. (He also believes that it is moving—funeral by funeral, retirement by retirement—in the direction of a less rigid, “fragmented adhocacy.”)<sup>32</sup> Yet some of the characteristic forms of exclusion that mark the discipline in the United States today have little if anything to do with the so-called paradigm war. So, even if the so-called war is winding down, a more open and cosmopolitan profession is unlikely. Radical or Marxist thinkers, journals, and debates disappeared from reading lists and practitioner histories decades ago. The intellectual nationalism as revealed in survey courses, author lists, journal article rosters, and the birthplaces of the research faculty of the major departments reinforces the effect. I lack Oren’s confidence about the gradual process of generational change.

Indeed, international relations research faculty across the United States are not likely to introduce graduate students to the arguments and thinkers of what MIT professor Lincoln Bloomfield once referred to as the “militant right” in foreign policy, political economy, and national security studies, and its historical influence within and beyond the discipline goes unrecognized.<sup>33</sup> *Orbis*, originally the militant right’s answer to *Foreign Affairs* and *World Politics*, has little standing today, if the routinely cited surveys of the profession are to be believed. Ideological blinders of this kind, together with the effects of time on memory generally, might lead someone reading my discussion of Possony’s *The Geography of Intellect* to respond that this particular Washington and specifically Pentagon insider and director of research at the Hoover Institution “was not a major figure in the discipline.” Think again. It is also important to note that the militant right leveled a double critique at a discipline-in-reformation: that it was insufficiently aggressive in the face of the communist threat and that the scientists’ self-styled “behavioral revolution” in international relations theory was intellectually irresponsible. That attack ultimately led to the creation of rival networks of think tanks, strategic studies associations, and the like. That history also has yet to be written.

The lingering effects of the racism in America that the profession of international relations both reflected and helped advance in the decades when empire was still “a word for scholars” can be gauged in today’s departments and schools of international relations. No critical mass of intellectuals of color exists in this sector of the U.S. academy. The work of the Howard school thinkers are not taught. Prejudice can continue to operate unopposed; when a faculty member proposes a next project on regional economic organizations in Africa and the Caribbean, his colleagues will criticize it for a lack of theoretical ambition in comparison to the study of “important places or problems.”

The condition is quite possibly permanent. The 1960s, when the black studies revolution broke out on college campuses, was a “critical juncture.” Although the insurgency resulted in the partial decolonization of some regions of the humanities and human sciences, international relations today remains a white, mainly male rampart that exhibits routine anxieties about the various threats beyond the walls.

This book is a brief for deepening engagement across the paradoxical interdisciplinary divides in the humanities and social sciences. If I have identified a weak point or two in the intellectual bulwark of the practitioners, exploiting that weakness will depend on the cooperative efforts of critics on the periphery of the discipline and potential allies among scholars within the humanities. The hope is that historians, historical sociologists, and professors of literature, culture, and theory will engage with critical international relations scholarship, beginning with John Hobson’s brilliant post-Said genealogy of the varieties of Eurocentrism that haunt international thought in the twenty-first century. His work applies, for instance, to the histories of Anglophone internationalism that nonetheless tend to stop at the edge of the Black Atlantic (and the Black Pacific).<sup>34</sup> Similarly, international theorists in American studies and beyond have much to teach dissidents.<sup>35</sup> Critical scholars in all these fields are well positioned to continue the kind of analysis begun here. The boundaries of international relations theory and in particular work in security studies, “grand strategy,” and the study of U.S. foreign policy remain open and ripe for infiltration. Colleagues there should lead their students across the borders of inquiry and, as Louis Menand advises, “take no hostages.”<sup>36</sup>

There is no mystery about why the barbarians of cultural studies and the critics of scientific expertise are seen as threats to disciplinary order and subject to embargo as far as possible. Some may accept the revisionist account of the discipline’s past presented here but argue that it is an anomaly or exception, as Americans often do about the nation’s less-than-perfect past.

The founders have been forgotten for good reason. They seemingly had not yet discovered how to inoculate themselves against the ravages of culture. Needless to say, no such vaccine exists. The history of ideas, institutions, and practices has a constitutive role in their present forms and functions. Just so, critics have exposed the many ways in which deep-rooted commitments to hierarchy continue to inform the discipline and its allied intellectual networks even now.<sup>37</sup> Meanwhile, in the “real world,” the subjection continues through new-old policies of intervention, tutelage, and targeted killings in new-old zones of anarchy and civilization deficit. It leads one to ask what other unselfconscious factors of the day distort scholars’ understandings, given that so many in the American academy were hypnotized so long by the seeming truths of racism.

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## NOTES

### Preface

1. Koelsch, *Clark University*, 70.

2. Vitalis, “International Studies in America”; and Vitalis, “Birth of a Discipline.” For circulation of the journal’s origin since then, see, for example, Anderson, *Pursuing Truth, Exercising Power*; Blatt, “‘To Bring Out the Best That Is in Their Blood’”; Norton, “Political Science as a Vocation,” 69; Lederman, “Anthropological Regionalism,” 313; Lowndes, Novkov, and Warren, *Race and American Political Development*; and Tickner, *A Feminist Voyage through International Relations*, 121.

3. William Bundy, “The History of Foreign Affairs,” *Foreign Affairs*, 1994, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/about-us/history>, accessed October 4, 2014. I presented a short version of the story on a panel on which managing editor (and now editor) of *Foreign Affairs* Gideon Rose also appeared.

4. See Peter Kihss, “Dr. W. E. B. Du Bois Joins Communist Party at 93,” *New York Times*, November 23, 1961.

### Introduction: A Mongrel American Social Science

1. There are, nonetheless, scholars in international relations in the United States, Canada, Great Britain, Australia, and elsewhere that are critical of the mainstream’s ongoing, pervasive preferential option for the powerful and more generally for “the West.” See Barkawi and Laffey, “The Postcolonial Moment in Security Studies”; Hobson, “Is Critical Theory Always for the White West and for Western Imperialism?”; and Hobson, *The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics*. For the relationship between Hobson’s work and mine, see Vitalis, “A Great-Grandson Breaks New Ground in Critical IR Thought.”

2. Around 1998, as I launched this project on recovering the history of black scholars in international relations in an era of segregation, racism, and imperialism, other political scientists were taking up the issue of race in the contemporary era and the discipline’s silence about it. They include Roxanne Doty, Siba Grovogui, Errol Henderson, Sankaran Krishna, James Mittleman, Randy Persaud, Robbie Shilliam, Srdjan Vucetic, Rob Walker, and Hilborne Watson. For a comprehensive bibliography and representative example of the state of the art, see Buzas, “Race and International Politics.” For the present range of views, see “Confronting the Global Colour Line: Space, Race and Imperial Hierarchy in World Politics,” a special issue of the *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* (26, no. 1 [2013]). I intend this and subsequent citations to the secondary literature to be suggestive rather than exhaustive. Interested readers are always one click or one book or article away from the expanded set of references, and we have a lot of ground to cover across the humanities and social sciences.

3. See, however, Singh, *Black Is a Country*.

4. Those who aren't familiar with the signal contributions of Carol Anderson, Brent Edwards, Kevin Gaines, Paul Gilroy, Robin Kelley, Winston James, Susan Pennybacker, Brenda Plummer, Nikhil Singh, and Penny Von Eschen, among others, will find the references and get up to speed on the state of the art in Gore, *Radicalism at the Crossroads*; McDuffie, *Sojourning for Freedom*; Makalani, *In the Cause of Freedom*; and James, *George Padmore and Decolonization from Below*.

5. See Go, *Patterns of Empire*, for a recent standout in the long analytical tradition that international relations has for the most part ignored; Hobson, *The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics*, part II, for the varieties of positions on offer; and Kramer, *Blood of Government*, for an exemplary analysis of the role social scientists played in the occupation of the Philippines.

6. Vitalis, *America's Kingdom*. For a brief discussion of the relationship between *America's Kingdom* and this book, see my "Writing America's Kingdom," [http://abuaardvark.typepad.com/qahwa\\_sada/files/americaskingdom.pdf](http://abuaardvark.typepad.com/qahwa_sada/files/americaskingdom.pdf), accessed July 25, 2014.

7. See, for example, Mills, "Crackpot Realism"; Chomsky, *American Power and the New Mandarins*; and Oren, "The Enduring Relationship between the American (National Security) State and the State of the Discipline," 51–55 for just three of the many influential dissections of the university's relationship to empire. One might also follow Chomsky's many exchanges with political scientists in the 1960s and 1970s in the *New York Review of Books*. For policymakers' views of new model of international relations professors and a likening of their role to that of "shamans," see Kuklick, *Blind Oracles*.

8. Rice studied with Albright's father, Josef Korbel, the founding director of the Center for International Studies at the University of Denver.

9. Zakaria, "The Rise of a Great Power," 1, 3.

10. See, for example, James Traub's review, "'The Right War?' and 'A Matter of Principle': Everybody Is a Realist Now," *New York Times*, October 30, 2005, <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/30/books/review/30traub.html?pagewanted=all>, accessed July 16, 2014. In addition, see Oren, "The Unrealism of Contemporary Realism."

11. Nye, *Bound to Lead*; and Nye, *Soft Power*, which has gone through multiple editions. For the reputational rankings, see Maliniak, Peterson, and Tierney, "Trip around the World." For a dismissal of the consensus view, see Anderson, "Consilium," 119. The *New Left Review* devoted an entire issue to Anderson's two-part analysis of "nonconformist" and "mainstream" foreign policy analysis.

12. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*.

13. Kuklick, *Blind Oracles*, 40, describes George Kennan, the culturally conservative career diplomat and later "guru of foreign affairs" as the "first intellectual middleman of postwar national security studies."

14. The critique in Waever, "The Sociology of a Not So International Discipline," applied to virtually the entire contents of the 50th-anniversary issue of the journal. Kuklick calls the genre "practitioner histories."

15. I began this project at the same time that Carleton University's Brian Schmidt (PhD State University of New York, Albany, 1995) was completing a dissertation that would become *The Political Discourse of Anarchy*. Twenty years later he leads a small group of exceptional professors of international relations who prove the rule. That is, they have made the history of the discipline and its leading ideas a primary focus of their scholarship (a "subfield"), attending to the problem of historical validity in ways that historians do and moonlighting insiders do not. They include Luke Ashworth, Duncan Bell, John Hobson, David Long, Nicolas Guilhot (the one non-international

relations outlier), and Ido Oren. Their work has been of tremendous value, and this book succeeds in part to the extent that its findings are surprising and yet convincing even to them. Nonetheless, the imagined audience for this book extends beyond them and kindred dissident international relations theorists to diplomatic and intellectual historians, historical sociologists of race and empire, students of inter-war internationalism, historians of the social sciences and area studies, humanists in American studies, African American studies, and specialists in black internationalism.

16. Thomas, “‘We’re Saying the Same Thing,’” 40–41.

17. On the uses and abuses of Thucydides, see Garst, “Thucydides and Neorealism”; Bagby, “The Use and Abuse of Thucydides in International Relations”; and Welch, “Why International Relations Theorists Should Stop Reading Thucydides.”

18. To test this claim, browse one of the online syllabus repositories in international relations.

19. Schmidt, *The Political Discourse of Anarchy*, for example, demonstrates that the “first great debate” from which the discipline is said to have emerged never actually occurred. His critic, Ole Wæver, is right that the idea nonetheless “has become socially real if historically false”; Wæver, “The Sociology of a Not So International Discipline,” 692. The idea of “race” is another, even more immutable, biologically false social fact, although there is no convincing those leading what Troy Duster calls “the current march toward a biological reinscription of the concept.” Duster, “Race and Reification in Science,” 1050–1051.

20. See Moon, *Syllabus on International Relations*; and Ware, *Study of International Relations in the United States*. Both the new International Institute of Education (est. 1919) and the Social Science Research Council (est. 1923) sought to advance the new science in the United States, the latter through its Committee on International Relations. World War I led to increased enrollments in courses devoted to what the post-1898 pioneers at Wisconsin, Chicago, Clark, Harvard, and, above all, Columbia, offered up as a “new” interdisciplinary science, and the objective was to advance teaching and research in the peacetime context of the founding decade of the League of Nations and growing tensions across the color line.

21. Menand, *The Marketplace of Ideas*, 107–117.

22. Ibid., 115. For the effort to secure hegemony, see Guilhot, *The Invention of International Relations Theory*; and the H-Diplo/ISSF Roundtable on Nicolas Guilhot, ed. *The Invention of International Relations Theory: Realism, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the 1954 Conference on Theory* (2011), 3, 5 (November 9, 2011), available as a PDF file at <http://h-diplo.org/roundtables/index.html#2011>.

23. Since some will consider this an overstatement, let me note, first, that it is a claim about a central tendency and not a report of the result of a polling of the professoriate. I have nonetheless been told more than once that the discipline has resolved the question definitively in the negative. I was told this, second, even as a few card-carrying U.S. members of the American Political Science and International Studies Associations used the occasion of accounts in the press and journals of opinion for and against America’s “new” imperial turn in Iraq to weigh in. The rough result was two qualified no answers. One is in Lake, *Hierarchy in International Relations*, which draws in part on earlier formulations and rediscovers what an entire generation took for granted; namely that hierarchy and not anarchy characterizes the world we live in. The other is in Ikenberry, “Illusions of Empire,” which affirms the liberal or exceptional nature of U.S. rule. There was one yes response, in Nexon and Wright, “What’s at Stake in the American Empire Debate.” Motivated readers might further test the claim by examining syllabi repositories to see if these works are included in the syllabi of courses that prepare graduate students for their exams in



the field. They didn't in my department. They are less rather than more likely to do so as Americans imagine the end of such episodes and the pundits turn to debating U.S. "retreat" and "retrenchment."

24. Doyle, *Empires*, 11. See, however, Vitalis, "Birth of a Discipline"; and Barkawi, "Empire and Order in International Relations and Security Studies."

25. I use the Carnegie Corporation grant programs and the Rockefeller Foundation here for convenience while recognizing that the latter in particular emerged out of the amalgamation of a number of different "memorials" during the period with which we are concerned. For background by the sociologist most concerned with the relationship of foundations to international relations as an academic discipline in an era of the rise of global U.S. power, see Parmar, *Foundations of the American Century*.

26. One problem is that until very recently studies of the history of the emerging social science disciplines have failed to consider the new imperialism as a phenomenon that shapes these institutions. See Kramer, "The Pragmatic Empire," 380–383 (revision published as *Blood of Government*), together with my own and other contributions to Long and Schmidt, *Imperialism and Internationalism in the Discipline of International Relations*; and Steinmetz, *Sociology and Empire*, notably the introduction by Steinmetz and Go, "Sociology's Imperial Unconscious," 83–105. Calls for recovering and overcoming the imperialist predisposition of international relations are common abroad. See e.g., Jones, *Decolonizing International Relations*.

27. Stocking's pathbreaking account of neo-Lamarckism in the social sciences, *Race, Culture, and Evolution*, discussed a number of scholars in international relations and articles from the field's *Journal of Race Development*, but Stocking's work on racial science was not linked to theory building in political science and international relations until Hattam, *In the Shadow of Race*; Vitalis, "The Noble American Science of Imperial Relations and Its Laws of Race Development"; and Hobson, *The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics*. Hattam and I are both indebted to Adolph Reed Jr.

28. Compare with the idea that international relations "emerged as a social science relatively late," in the 1930s, at the University of Chicago in Frieden and Lake, "International Relations as a Social Science." Among other ironies, the essay appears in the journal *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, where early international relations theorists (not international lawyers) started publishing at the turn of the century.

29. For references to self-determination, see Locke, "Enter the New Negro," 631–634; and "Harlem: Mecca of the New Negro," 629–630.

30. These institutions and publications in turn have not been recognized in histories of international relations until now.

31. Franklin, "Dilemma of the American Negro Scholar," 71. I found the essay by first reading Howard historian Michael Winston's influential "Through the Back Door."

32. If Nancy Cunard, the disowned shipping heiress, anthologist extraordinaire (Locke's copy of her *Negro: An Anthology* (1934) sits in the University of Pennsylvania's rare books room), and George Padmore's collaborator, represents the model race traitor of her time, then interwar-era international relations represents an empty set. However, Locke's papers include correspondence in 1923 with Carl Joachim Friedrich, a future president of both the American Political Science Association and the International Political Science Association. Friedrich was then on a kind of student goodwill tour, had not yet finished his Heidelberg PhD, and was three years away from his original appointment as lecturer at Harvard. Locke had been teaching for over a decade. Yet Friedrich calls the diminutive Locke "my little philosopher" in

recalling a night, I think, at the theater (meanwhile typing “J” for “I” throughout). “You cannot imagine how glad J am about the last evening with You, and J am always carrying around with me the problems of racial sex arisen there. J was surprised to find verified my assertion that a slawic [Slavic?] jounge man wouldn’t accept the second play at all in hearing the judgment of Palacek about it. Whatever it may be, J am too stupid to understand it, what constitutes these metaphysical differences. Why can’t the one people make wonderful music when the other makes beautiful dramas? Why can the one peo[p]le produce merely efficient businessmen when the other produces victorious generals? Are those facts all accidental?” Friedrich to Locke, January 12, 1923, box 30, folder 29, Papers of Alain Leroy Locke, Moorland Spingarn Research Center, Howard University, Washington, D.C. (hereafter Locke Papers).

33. See Frances Buell’s unpublished memoir of Corwin, April 1959, box 40, folder 15, Misc., Buell, Frances, 1946–1959, Raymond Leslie Buell Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. (hereafter Buell Papers LC). Both the *New Yorker* and the *University of Michigan Law Review* turned down the memoir for publication.

34. See Francis Stead Sellers, “The 60-Year Journey of the Ashes of Alain Locke, Father of the Harlem Renaissance,” *Washington Post Magazine*, September 12, 2014, [http://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/magazine/the-60-year-journey-of-the-ashes-of-alain-locke-father-of-the-harlem-renaissance/2014/09/11/2ea31ccc-2878-11e4-86ca-6f03cbd15c1a\\_story.html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/magazine/the-60-year-journey-of-the-ashes-of-alain-locke-father-of-the-harlem-renaissance/2014/09/11/2ea31ccc-2878-11e4-86ca-6f03cbd15c1a_story.html), accessed September 30, 2014.

35. See Gill, “Gramsci and Global Politics,” 1; and Gill, “Epistemology, Ontology, and the ‘Italian School,’” for the first uses of “Italian school.” For its dissemination, see Germain and Kenny, “Engaging Gramsci.” For a different and narrower application of the concept to Howard’s leading thinkers, see Henry, “Abram Harris, E. Franklin Frazier, and Ralph Bunche.”

36. See Toni Morrison’s “Black Matters,” the first of her three Massey Lectures, in *Playing in the Dark*, 9–10.

37. I am including Tilden LeMelle, who taught at Denver and the City University of New York; Lockesley Edmundson at Cornell; Martin Kilson in the years since his retirement from teaching at Harvard; Neta Crawford at Boston University; Hilbourne Watson, recently retired from Bucknell; and Errol Henderson at Penn State. In addition, see “ISP Forum: Diversity in the International Studies Profession,” notably the briefs by Christian Davenport, Brandon Valeriano, Wendy Theodore, and Minion K. C. Morrison.

38. On the parochialism of the U.S. professors in these matters generally, see Alker and Biersteker, “The Dialectics of World Order.”

39. Vitalis, “The Graceful and Generous Liberal Gesture.”

40. Arnold Rampersad quote from the distributor’s publicity materials for the documentary. <http://newsreel.org/video/RALPH-BUNCHE>.

41. Huggins, “Afro-American Studies: A Report to the Ford Foundation,” 29.

42. Tate’s research program can hardly be fitted to either tendency or moment—methodological nationalist or global imaginary—in the story black or Africana studies tells about itself, and she has been completely overlooked until recently. Sexism has played a role as well, as we will see.

43. To simplify a little, the first signals a more expansive focus on the reasons for and contemporary conditions of the larger African diaspora, of which African Americans form a part.

44. Biondi, *The Black Revolution on Campus*, 174–180.

45. Wallerstein, “The Unintended Consequences of Cold War Area Studies.”

46. Rooks, *White Money/Black Power*.

47. Rojas, *From Black Power to Black Studies*, 3, 21.

48. Biondi, *The Black Revolution on Campus*, 249–253; Rojas, *From Black Power to Black Studies*, 202.

49. Biondi, *The Black Revolution on Campus*, 251.

50. Kelley, “‘But a Local Phase of a World Problem.’” Among other signposts and programmatic statements of the shift, this key piece by Kelley appeared in a special issue of the *Journal of American History* titled “The Nation and Beyond: Transnational Perspectives on American History,” which is itself evidence that other quadrants of the humanities or human science were busy taking the transnational turn as well.

51. Steinmetz, *Sociology and Empire*, x; Wimmer and Schiller, “Methodological Nationalism and Beyond.”

52. Guyer, “Perspectives on the Beginning”; Gershenhorn, *Melville J. Herskovits and the Racial Politics of Knowledge*, 182–187.

53. See Ralph Bunche to Joseph Willits, [Head of the Social Sciences Division,] Rockefeller Foundation, September 15, 1950, box 112, folder Institute of Pacific Relations, Ralph J. Bunche Papers, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California at Los Angeles (hereafter Bunche Papers). Bunche pressed Willits to aid the Institute of Pacific Relations as it faced charges of abetting the communist takeover of China and/or serving as a communist front. If the latter were remotely true, Bunche would have dissociated himself from it, as he had the Committee on African Affairs. Instead, he was working quietly to save it.

54. Robinson, “Area Studies in Search of Africa”; Robinson, “Ralph Bunche and African Studies”; and Robinson, “Ralph Bunche the Africanist.”

55. Payson Wild to Gerald Freund, March 24, 1961, Record Group 1.2, Series 200S, box 522, folder 4459, Rockefeller Foundation Archives, Rockefeller Archive Center, Tarrytown, N.Y. (hereafter Rockefeller Foundation Archives).

56. Other intellectuals, particularly those in African studies and Caribbean studies, those who campaigned against apartheid, and those who founded organizations such as Transafrica, did write cogent analyses of contemporary world affairs for scholarly and movement journals. A good place to start is Minter, Hovey, and Cobb, *No Easy Victories*.

57. *Foreign Affairs* is conventionally categorized and ranked with the discipline’s peer-reviewed journals without noting the key difference. In addition it is usually the only non-peer-reviewed journal included on such lists. See, for example, Yoder and Bramlett, “What Happens at the Journal Office Stays at the Journal Office.” The authors were unaware of this key difference with the rest of the list (e-mail communication with me), as was I until recently. EBSCO Information Services meanwhile distinguishes between “academic” (that is, those with footnotes) and “scholarly” (peer-reviewed) journals.

58. Langer, *In and Out of the Ivory Tower*, 81.

59. For a complementary account of a moment that deserves more extensive study, see Go, “Sociology’s Imperial Unconscious.”

60. Gunnell, “Founding of the American Political Science Association,” discusses Burgess’s eclipse without reference to the imperial adventures that played a key role in provoking the split. For Burgess as a public intellectual, see Nicols, *Promise and Peril*.

61. Fox, “Interwar International Relations Research.”

62. Gilman calls “the postwar comparativists” associated with the Social Science Research Council in the early 1950s “the first group of American political scientists to consider non-Western countries worthy of systematic empirical inquiry”; Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future*, 118.

### Conclusion: The High Plane of Dignity and Discipline

1. Lindblom, “Political Science in the 1940s and 1950s,” 261. As George Steinmetz writes about political science’s close relative, “Sociology can never aspire to be a cumulative science in which earlier work can be safely discarded. Ongoing social research always remains connected to its own past in ways that distinguish the human sciences from the natural sciences. The much vaunted reflexivity of social science requires historical self-analysis. Intellectual history or the historical sociology of social science is an integral part of all social science.” Steinmetz, *Sociology and Empire*, xi.

2. Barnes, Review of *Empire and Commerce in Africa*, 130–131, quotation from Woolf in this paragraph from 131.

3. Quoted in Woolf, “International Morality.”

4. Woolf quoted in Bain, *Between Anarchy and Society*, 84.

5. White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by the President at the US-Africa Business Forum,” August 5, 2014, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/08/05/remarks-president-us-africa-business-forum>, accessed August 20, 2014.

6. In *Imperialism* (1902), John A. Hobson, another supporter of the mandates, sought a strategy, as his great grandson puts it, for bringing the “practice of the benign civilizing mission into line with the theory.” Hobson, *The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics*, 47.

7. For a discussion of the key differences, based on Bunche’s analysis of one mandate and one non-mandate French possession, see Crawford, “Decolonization through Trusteeship,” 93–114.

8. Abbott, “A Re-Examination of the 1929 Colonial Development Act,” 68–81; Hinds, *Britain’s Sterling Colonial Policy and Decolonization*.

9. Perham, “African Facts and American Criticisms,” 444–457. Equally reliably, the first postmortem of the amended Colonial Development and Welfare Acts showed that local British colonial administrations had no planning mechanisms in place and that the earmarked funds went unused. See Wicker, “Colonial Development and Welfare, 1929–1957,” 170–192.

10. Isaacs, *The New World of Negro Americans*, ix, xiv.

11. The quote is from Jackson, “Surrogate Sovereignty?,” 9. Support for this point can also be found in Bain, *Between Anarchy and Society*, 121–124; and Lyon, “The Rise and Fall and Possible Revival of Trusteeship,” 96–110.

12. Crawford, “Decolonization through Trusteeship”; Fearon and Laitin, “Neotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak States,” 5–43. See also Pugh, “Whose Brother’s Keeper?,” 321–343, both for following the state of debate and for the author’s fanciful account of the “flexible” UN Trusteeship “system,” which Pugh claims the designers intended to apply to any and all “weak, postcolonial, post-conflict or fractured states” that might be “administered under the aegis of the UN, a great power state, or group of states” (324). Bunche would be rolling over in his grave if he saw that. Pugh also explains the logic behind trusteeship in the way that his international relations ancestors once explained imperialism: “a parent (or foster parent) teaches a child how to take care of herself during the first two decades of her life before allowing herself to take responsibility for herself in the world” (328).

13. For the powerful hold of this idea, see Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace*; and Throntveit, “The Fable of the Fourteen Points,” 445–481.

14. Contrast the idea of the Wilsonian moment with St. Croix-born, Harlem-based writer and orator Hubert Harrison’s dissection of the white race at war and the prospects for independence in India and Egypt following its end. Harrison, “The White War and the Colored World,” 202–203.

15. For the radical revisioning of Germany in the imagination of political scientists, see Oren, *Our Enemies and US*.

16. See Guillhot, “Imperial Realism.”

17. Dobbin, Jones, Crane, and DeGrasse, *Beginner’s Guide to Nation-Building*.

18. Kuklick, *Blind Oracles*, 160–161. For May’s continued disdain for the revisionists, see Ruth Glushien, “Profile Ernest R. May,” *Harvard Crimson*, October 18, 1969, <http://www.thecrimson.com/article/1969/10/18/profile-ernest-r-may-ptwo-years/>, accessed August 23, 2014.

19. Vitalis, “The Democratization Industry and the Limits of the New Interventionism,” 46–50.

20. Brownlee, *Democracy Prevention*.

21. Quoted in Hazbun, “The Geopolitics of Knowledge and the Challenge of Postcolonial Agency,” 217.

22. Faust, “The Scholar Who Shaped History.”

23. For example, Howe, *Afrocentrism*.

24. Marable, *Malcolm X*.

25. For example, Gaddis, *George F. Kennan*, which has no index entries for race, racism, African Americans, eugenics, and so forth, and a one-sentence explanation, in the course of explaining Kennan’s defense of separate development and of the incapacity of “Bantus” to govern themselves, for his long held belief that “race shaped culture” (603). Kennan was a throwback to John W. Burgess.

26. H. R. Haldeman diary entry for April 28, 1969, quote in Plummer, *In Search of Power*, 251. Nixon (and doubtless others) distinguished between personal feelings of enmity (“prejudice”) and the truth of sociobiology. “I have the greatest affection for them [blacks], but I know they’re not going to make it for 500 years. They aren’t. You know it, too. I mean, all, this, uh, Julie [Nixon Eisenhower], I asked her about the black studies program at Smith. You know . . . and she said, the trouble [is], they didn’t find anything to study. . . . The Mexicans are a different cup of tea. They have a heritage, but at the present time they steal, they’re dishonest, but they do have some concept of family life at least. They don’t live like a bunch of dogs, which the Negroes do live like.” Nixon in conversation with John Erlichman and H. R. Haldeman, May 13, 1971, Conversation No. 498–005, Presidential Recordings Program, Miller Center, University of Virginia, <http://whitehousetapes.net/clip/richard-nixon-john-erlichman-hr-haldeman-nixon-race>.

27. Kaplan, “Looking the World in the Eye,” 68–82.

28. Huntington, “Clash of Civilizations,” 25.

29. Ikenberry, “Illusions of Empire,” 144–154, my emphasis.

30. Vucetic, *The Anglosphere*.

31. Biersteker, “The Parochialism of Hegemony.”

32. Oren, “A Sociological Analysis of the Decline of American IR Theory”; and Whitley, *The Intellectual and Social Organization of the Sciences*.

33. Holsti, “The Study of Strange Bedfellows,” 217–242; and Pfaltzgraff, Holsti, Riley, Kennington, Marenin, Eckstein, Bloom, and Allen, “Communications.”

34. On the histories of internationalism (of which the discipline of international relations forms a part) and the beginnings of engagement with worldwide liberation struggles see Mazower, *Governing the World*; Sluga, *Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism*; Parmar, *Foundations of the American Century*; Rietzler, “Experts for Peace”; Pedersen, *The Guardians*; Zimmerman, *Alabama in Africa*; and Anderson, “Pacific Dreams.”

35. Including Douglas, “Periodizing the American Century”; Gines, *Hannah Arendt and the Negro Question*; Gordon, *Creolizing Political Theory*; Kaplan, *The Anarchy of Empire in the Making of U.S. Culture*; and Singh, *Exceptional Empire*.

36. Menand, *The Marketplace of Ideas*; Jenny Blair, “Louis Menand Challenges Humanities Colleagues to ‘Take No Hostages,’” *Alcalde*, April 26, 2013, <http://alcalde.texasexes.org/2013/04/louis-menand-challenges-humanities-colleagues-to-take-no-hostages/>, accessed March 1, 2014.

37. Including Tarek Barkawi, Branwen Gruffydd Jones, John Hobson, Naeem Inayatullah, Lily Ling, Richard Seymour, Robbie Shilliam, Christine Sylvester, and J. Ann Tickner. Their work will lead readers to others who have been left off the reading lists of intro courses and grad seminars.

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